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## The Hispanic Vote in the 2024 U.S. Presidential Elections

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**Abstract:** This study analyzes the Hispanic vote in the 2024 U.S. elections, comparing census, survey, and exit poll data. We examine the size, distribution, and participation of the Hispanic electorate, as well as the behavior of Hispanic voters with respect to the variables of home language, ancestry (observing notable differences between Cubans, Mexicans, and Puerto Ricans), sex, age (noting stronger support for Republicans among young men), education, economic status, and religion. We identified family economics as a priority that cut across these variables. Additionally, we evaluate party preferences in ten key states—California, Texas, Florida, and the swing states—highlighting the relative increase in Hispanic support for the candidacy of Donald Trump. Moreover, we identified significant discrepancies between polls like the NEP and the 2024-AEVP—attributable to methodological deficiencies and biases—that demonstrate the difficulty of measuring the minority vote, as well as the need to revise dominant media narratives and reinterpret the so-called “Hispanic shift” toward the Republican Party. Similarly, calculations based on the most commonly cited estimates suggest that the Hispanic vote was not a decisive factor in Donald Trump’s victory, a finding at odds with the dominant narrative in media discourse.

**Keywords:** Hispanic vote in the U.S., presidential elections, election polls, electoral behavior, political demographics, media impact.

\* Editors’ note: This is an English translation, provided by the Observatorio, of the authors’ original text in Spanish (see 095-03/2025SP).

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## 1. Introduction

Presidential elections in the United States elicit global interest every time they are held. Given the personalities of the candidates who competed in the most recent presidential contest, the 2024 elections drew a particularly high level of media attention, both inside and outside the United States. Election day—November 5, 2024—culminated in a clear victory for Republican candidate Donald Trump, in a competition that many expected to be considerably tighter.

The voting intentions of the Hispanic community had already attracted attention during the campaign season, but once election day had passed and the results were decided, the Hispanic vote became one of the most widely discussed phenomena with respect to Trump’s victory. The topic resonated so strongly, in fact, that it continues to inspire debate. In the days after the election, mainstream media in the United States, Latin America, and Spain emphasized the dramatic increase in Hispanic support for Republican candidate Donald Trump when compared to the 2020 elections—a focus that has shaped public opinion on a global scale.<sup>1</sup> This interpretation is based on data from a single exit poll: the National Election Pool survey (hereinafter NEP). The NEP is a media consortium in the United States founded in 2003 to provide data on U.S. elections collected through exit polls. It is currently comprised of ABC News, CBS News, CNN, and NBC News. Since 2018, the NEP has commissioned the company Edison Research to manage these exit polls.

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<sup>1</sup> “The starkest increase may have been the 14-percentage-point swing in Trump’s share of Hispanic voters, according to an exit poll conducted by Edison Research. Some 46% of self-identified Hispanic voters picked Trump, up from 32% in the 2020 election” (Lange, Erickson & Heath, 2024, for Reuters); “Trump won an astounding 46% of Latinos in this election. That’s the highest ever for a Republican, even higher than George W. Bush in 2004” (Montanaro, 2024, for NPR); “Trump made historic inroads with voters of color, immigrants and Latinos” (Brammer, 2024, for the *Los Angeles Times*); “An analysis of the exit poll conducted by *The Washington Post* reveals that Latino men helped Trump win the White House, with 54% voting for Trump and 44% for Harris” (*El Universal*, 2024, translated from the Spanish); “Latino support for candidate and now president-elect Donald Trump increased 13 points this election, reaching 45% and surpassing the record for Republican presidential candidates previously set by George W. Bush in 2004” (*El Tiempo*, 2024, translated from the Spanish); “Trump won the support of 45% of Latino voters nationwide, compared to the 53% for Harris, according to exit polls conducted by *NBC News*. Support for Trump is much higher than it was in 2020, when he received 32% compared to Joe Biden’s 65%” (Lugones, 2024, for *Clarín*, translated from the Spanish); “Trump won by a wider margin than he did in the 2020 election, reducing the Democrats’ edge over the Latino vote from 33 to 8 points. This happened despite the hardline immigration agenda of the billionaire, who on Thursday reiterated that he plans to carry out mass deportations” (Herréras, 2024, for *El País*, translated from the Spanish); “The Hispanic Vote: An Electoral Earthquake That Threatens the Future of the Democratic Party” (Ansorena, 2024, for *ABC*, translated from the Spanish).

However, as the following sections illustrate, data from other exit polls and voting intention surveys do not always coincide with the results published by the NEP. In fact, in several cases, the differences between the NEP and other surveys are significant.

In response to the dominant narrative that Trump received surprising and unprecedented Hispanic support, some media outlets pointed out biases and other methodological problems in the NEP poll that compromise the reliability of the data on the minority vote. They also cited results from other sources, mainly the 2024 American Electorate Voter Poll<sup>2</sup> (hereinafter 2024–AEVP), a national survey conducted by researchers from BSP Research, the African American Research Collaborative, and Harvard University, specifically designed to reflect the voting choices of the main minority groups in the United States. Although this source also suggests a notable shift in Hispanic support in favor of the Republican Party and to the detriment of the Democratic Party, it reports significantly less support for Trump than the NEP.

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Given the discrepancies in the results of different studies and surveys, this report seeks to outline the features that define the electoral profile of Hispanic voters, their role in the election, and their impact on the outcome, considering a broad selection of data sources. To assess the electoral behavior of this heterogeneous community of Hispanic voters, this study relies on census data, statistical studies based on voting intention surveys conducted prior to the elections, and the results of exit polls. Our aim is to provide a general and comprehensive overview by comparing these different sources while highlighting discrepancies and agreements, as well as any general trends that these results suggest.

It is important to note that the findings presented below are mostly estimates that have yet to be verified because the data to support them is currently unavailable. It will be

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<sup>2</sup> “Unfortunately, exit polls don’t have a very good track record, and they can contribute to misleading narratives on election night. In particular, early exit polls have a poor track record when it comes to measuring Black, Latino and younger voters” (Rogers, 2024, for *The New York Times*); “Latino groups such as UnidosUS, Voto Latino, La Brega y Fuerza Fund, and the Hispanic Federation joined forces with other minority representatives, including Asian Americans Advancing Justice and the AARC, to highlight the flaws in exit polling. They argue these polls often fail to accurately represent minorities, leading to a skewed portrayal of these communities.” (Caro, 2024, for *El País*, translated from the Spanish); “¿Did the Latino Vote Deliver Victory to Trump? A New Study Says No” (Telemundo, 2024, translated from the Spanish).

interesting, therefore, to compare this study’s findings with the “November Voting and Registration Supplement” conducted as part of the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey (CPS), and with the official reports for each U.S. state, co-published by the Clerk of the United States House of Representatives and the Federal Election Commission.

## 2. The Hispanic Electorate in 2024: Key Facts

In this section, we present key data on Hispanics who were eligible to vote in the 2024 presidential election. We should note that voting in the U.S. presidential election is open to U.S. citizens over the age of 18 who reside in one of the country’s fifty states, or in the District of Columbia, and are registered to vote<sup>3</sup> (United States Government, 2024). Citizens who reside in the territories of the United States are not eligible to vote, meaning that the more than 2.67 million Puerto Ricans of voting age who live on the island were unable to participate in the last presidential election (U.S. Census Bureau & U.S. Department of Commerce, 2023b).

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### 2.1. Size, Growth, and Geographic Distribution of the Hispanic Electorate

It is common knowledge that Hispanics make up the largest minority in the United States. With a population that, according to estimates by the U.S. Census Bureau, exceeds 65 million people and represents around 20% of the country’s total population (U.S. Census Bureau, 2024; U.S. Census Bureau & U.S. Department of Commerce, 2023a), the voting decisions of this demographic can determine the outcomes of presidential elections.


As Figure 1 shows, according to estimates from the Pew Research Center, the number of Hispanics eligible to vote in 2024 rose to 36.2 million, representing 14.7% of the

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<sup>3</sup> In every U.S. state, with the exception North Dakota, citizens of voting age must register to participate in elections. Likewise, in the U.S., people convicted of felonies and people with certain mental disabilities are ineligible to vote. Regulations regarding this vary by state (United States Government, 2024).

total electorate—a historic figure (Krogstad et al., 2024). Considering that elections in the United States can be decided by fewer than a hundred thousand votes cast in certain key states, the Hispanic community can constitute a decisive group.

FIGURE 1  
Growth of the Hispanic Electorate from 2000 to 2024



Source: Authors' own work using data compiled by Krogstad et al. (2024), obtained from the 2000 U.S. Census, from estimates by the Pew Research Center and the American Community Survey, and from the Pew Research Center's projections for 2024.

In the 2020 elections, Hispanic voters numbered around 32.3 million<sup>4</sup> (Krogstad et al., 2024). The addition of nearly 4 million voters to the Hispanic electorate between 2020 and 2024 is a symptom of the overall growth of the Hispanic population in the U.S., which in 2023 increased by 1.8% from the previous year (U.S. Census Bureau, 2024). This is chiefly the result of a natural growth in population—more Hispanic people are born than die—although immigration continues to be a significant factor (U.S. Census Bureau, 2024).

<sup>4</sup> The Hispanic electorate increases at a rate of approximately 1.4 million people each year, and Hispanics accounted for 50% of the growth in the U.S. electorate from 2020 to 2024 (Krogstad et al., 2024).

The Pew Research Center's estimates of the number of Hispanics eligible to vote in the 2020 and 2024 elections are consistent with the increase in the number of Hispanic citizens of voting age reported by the Census Bureau: 32.7 million in 2021 compared to 34 million in 2023 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2021; U.S. Census Bureau & U.S. Department of Commerce, 2023b).

The states in which the population of Hispanic voters exceeds one million are California<sup>5</sup> (8.5 million), Texas (6.5 million), Florida (3.5 million), New York (2.2 million), Arizona (1.3 million), and New Jersey (1.06 million). More than two-thirds of the total Hispanic electorate lives in these six states (Krogstad et al., 2024; U.S. Census Bureau & U.S. Department of Commerce, 2023b).

New Mexico is the state with the highest percentage of Hispanic voters. While the state's Hispanic electorate is less than one million people (the figure is roughly 695,000), New Mexico is the only state where the percentage of Hispanic citizens of voting age (45%) exceeds that of any other racial or ethnic group.<sup>6</sup> The states with the next-highest percentages of Hispanic voters are California (33%), Texas (32%), Arizona (25%), Nevada (22%), Florida (22%), Colorado (17%), New Jersey (16%), and New York (15%) (Krogstad et al., 2024; U.S. Census Bureau & U.S. Department of Commerce, 2023b).

These statistics illustrate both the size and influence of the Hispanic electorate, whose voting choices can play a decisive role in states where this demographic comprises a significant percentage of the total population, but also in swing states, where their representation is significant in relation to the vote margin that typically decides state-level electoral results (see Tacher Contreras, 2020).

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
<sup>5</sup> A quarter of the Hispanic electorate lives in California, which is the most populous state in the U.S., with more than 39 million residents (Krogstad et al., 2024; U.S. Census Bureau & U.S. Department of Commerce, 2023a).

<sup>6</sup> Non-Hispanic whites are the second largest voting population in New Mexico and comprise 40% of the state's total electorate (Krogstad et al., 2024).

## 2.2. Age Demographics of the Hispanic Electorate

The Hispanic electorate, in addition to being heterogeneous in terms of the ethnic backgrounds of its constituents, is also younger than the general U.S. electorate. As Figure 2 shows, 31% of Hispanic voters are between the ages of 18 and 29. In comparison, this same age group accounts for only 20% of the general U.S. electorate. The percentage of Hispanic voters between the ages of 50 and 64, on the other hand, is lower, and the percentage of Hispanic voters over 65 is significantly lower (comprising 13% of the Hispanic electorate and 23% of the general U.S. electorate) (Krogstad et al., 2024).

FIGURE 2  
Age Demographics of the Hispanic Electorate vs. the General Electorate



Source: Authors' own work based on data from Krogstad et al. (2024).

## 2.3. Hispanic Voter Turnout

Hispanic voter turnout in the U.S. has traditionally been low. In 2020, out of the 30.6 million Hispanics eligible to vote, only about 16.5 million went to the polls—just short of 54% (Fabina & Scherer, 2022).

The Hispanic electorate's low turnout rate for presidential elections not only results in fewer votes that could directly affect election outcomes, but also indicates an underrepresentation of Hispanic voters compared to other groups. With respect to the 2020 presidential election, when comparing the number of Hispanics eligible to vote and the number of Hispanics who actually voted, the Hispanic electorate was by far the most underrepresented of the various groups, by a negative factor of 2.6 percentage points. The non-Hispanic Black population and the non-Hispanic Asian population were also underrepresented, albeit to a lesser extent: 0.7 and 0.5 percentage points, respectively. The non-Hispanic white electorate, on the other hand, was consistently overrepresented with a positive 4.2 percentage point difference (Fabina & Scherer, 2022).

Nevertheless, the 2020 elections saw a slight increase in Hispanic voter turnout compared to the 2016 elections. While this represented only a 0.1% reduction in the underrepresentation of the Hispanic community, higher voter turnout, coupled with the fact that Hispanics made up 10.6% of the total electorate in 2020—a record figure at the time—meant that their electoral impact was significantly greater than in previous cycles (Fabina & Scherer, 2022). This led many commentators to describe the phenomenon as an “awakening of the sleeping giant” (Güenechea & Ureña, 2020, pp. 12, 26). Indeed, more and more Hispanics are going to the polls, and the electoral survey data consulted for this study suggest that the participation of the Hispanic community in the 2024 elections was, in fact, higher than it was in 2020.

According to estimates by the Pew Research Center, the 2024 elections were the first presidential elections for 10.8% of the Hispanic electorate (Krogstad et al., 2024). However, no less than 20% of voters surveyed in November for the 2024-AEVP (2024)<sup>7</sup> said that this was the first time they had voted for President of the United States, while data from the NEP<sup>8</sup> report 15% of respondents voting for the first time in 2024, although that survey did not specify whether the question referred exclusively

<sup>7</sup> The 2024-AEVP survey was conducted between October 18, 2024 and November 4, 2024. The voting population sample includes 3,750 Hispanics (2024-AEVP, 2024).

<sup>8</sup> The NEP survey relied on a sample of 2,163 Hispanic voters (NBC News, 2024b; Edwards-Levy, 2024).

to the presidential elections (CNN, 2024). This suggests a higher voter turnout rate among Hispanics who had previously refrained from casting ballots. In addition, 21% of the Hispanic electorate between the ages of 18 and 39 say that they voted for the first time in 2024 (2024–AEVP, 2024).

### 3. The Hispanic Vote at the National Level

#### 3.1. The Hispanic Electorate's Support for Leading Presidential Candidates

This section presents data collected from different voting intention and exit poll surveys. While all of these sources reflect the Hispanic community's traditional majority support for the Democratic Party, there are some substantial differences in results that are particularly noteworthy. The Hispanic electorate's support for the Republican candidate ranges between 37% and 46%, representing a variation of 9 percentage points.

The source that reports the highest level of Hispanic support for Trump is the exit poll conducted for the NEP. Much of the U.S. and international media discourse concerning the Hispanic vote has relied on the results of this poll, which, in turn, has significantly influenced public opinion on a global scale.

According to the NEP, Kamala Harris received 51% of the Hispanic vote, securing an absolute majority by a margin of only one percentage point, while Trump received 46% (CNN, 2024; NBC, 2024a). This would represent a record result for the Republican Party, exceeding the 44% of Hispanic votes received by George W. Bush in the 2004 presidential elections by two percentage points (Gerbaud et al., 2024).<sup>9</sup>


As Figure 3 shows, when we compare the data from 2024 with the results of the NEP for the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections, Hispanic support for Trump increases

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<sup>9</sup> Studies conducted by the Pew Research Center indicate that Hispanic support for the Republican Party in the 2004 elections was probably not as high as indicated by estimates based on exit poll data, given the overrepresentation of pro-Republican Cuban voters and other demographic imbalances. State surveys, which are more consistent with the findings of the CPS, put support for Bush at around 40% (Suro et al., 2005).

from 28% in 2016 to 32% in 2020, and, finally, to 46% in 2024 (CNN 2016, 2020, & 2024). Between 2020 and 2024 alone, support for the Republican candidate increased by 14 percentage points.


FIGURE 3  
Evolution of the Hispanic Vote from 2016 to 2024, according to the NEP



Source: Authors' own work based on data from the NEP for 2016, 2020, and 2024 (CNN 2016, 2020, & 2024).

Other sources do not indicate such unprecedented Hispanic support for the 2024 Republican candidate. The 2024-AEVP (2024) poll reports 62% of voters favoring Harris and 37% favoring Trump. Figure 4 compares the data from the 2024-AEVP with the same polling data for 2016 and 2020.

FIGURE 4  
Evolution of the Hispanic Vote from 2016 to 2024, according to the AEVP




Source: Authors' own work based on data from the AEVP for 2016, 2020, and 2024 (UnidosUS, 2024).

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Although there is clear redistribution in the Hispanic vote in favor of the Republican Party, this shift is more gradual than the NEP data would suggest (18% in 2016, 27% in 2020, and 37% in 2024). The variation for 2020 would be 10 percentage points, but the results for 2024 are a far cry from the historic 44% received by George W. Bush in 2004, and even farther from the 46% reported by the NEP for 2024.

Figure 5 illustrates the results of four pre-election polls and the two exit polls mentioned above.

FIGURE 5  
The Hispanic Electorate’s Support for Leading Presidential Candidates Based on Pre-election Surveys and Exit Polls



Source: Authors’ own work based on data from the AP VoteCast (2024), NYT/SC (2024c), Pew Research Center (Krogstad et al., 2024), and AtlasIntel (2024) pre-election polls, as well as the NEP (CNN, 2024) and 2024-AEVP (2024) exit polls.

In line with the findings of the 2024-AEVP, the poll conducted by The New York Times and Siena College (hereinafter NYT/SC) reports 56% Hispanic support for Harris and 37% for Trump (2024c).<sup>10</sup> AtlasIntel (2024)<sup>11</sup> indicates 57.7% for Harris compared to 38.4% for Trump, and AP VoteCast<sup>12</sup> reports 55% and 43%, respectively (Associated Press, 2024).

<sup>10</sup> This is a national NYT/SC (2024c) survey designed specifically to study the voting choices of the country’s main minority groups. It was conducted between September 9, 2024 and October 6, 2024 with a sample that included 902 Hispanic voters. We should note that a subsequent voting intention survey conducted by the same institutions between October 20, 2024 and October 23, 2024 with a sample of 310 Hispanic voters reports significantly higher support for the Republican candidate (42% for Trump compared to 52% for Harris) (NYT/SC, 2024d).

<sup>11</sup> This is a national survey conducted between January 11, 2024 and February 11, 2024 using a sample of 2,463 voters, of whom 12.1% were Hispanic (AtlasIntel, 2024).

<sup>12</sup> AP VoteCast is a national survey conducted by NORC at the University of Chicago for Fox News, PBS NewsHour, The Wall Street Journal, and The Associated Press. It was conducted between October 28, 2024 and November 5, 2024 with a sample of nearly 120,000 voters, of whom 10% were Hispanic (Associated Press, 2024).

The Pew Research Center survey<sup>13</sup> indicates that 57% of Hispanic voters supported the Democratic candidate and 39% supported the Republican candidate. When comparing this data with the Pew Research Center’s findings for 2020, which report 61% Hispanic support for Biden and 36% for Trump, there is a 3-percentage-point increase in support for the Republican Party (Lopez & Noe-Bustamante, 2024). According to this source, however, the redistribution of the Hispanic vote between 2020 and 2024 is notably less than suggested by the data published by the NEP and 2024–AEVP.

On another note, the Pew Research Center study suggests that support for the Democratic Party would have been less if Joe Biden had remained the presidential candidate. A comparison of similar surveys conducted at different stages of the campaign clearly indicates that the former vice president was more popular among Hispanic voters than the then-former president: In surveys conducted in July—following the first presidential debate but before the assassination attempt against Trump at a campaign rally in Pennsylvania—only 51% of the Hispanic respondents said they would vote for Biden, while 46% said they would support Trump (Lopez & Noe-Bustamante, 2024).

It is also interesting to consider whether voters who cast ballots in favor of a candidate do so primarily because they support that candidate, or because they are voting against his or her opponent. To this point, 70% of Trump voters say that they voted in favor of the then-former president. In contrast, 54% of Harris voters say that they voted *against* Trump more than they voted *for* Harris (Lopez & Noe-Bustamante, 2024).

### 3.2. The Sociodemographics of the National Hispanic Vote

At the national level, Harris received more support than Trump in virtually all of the Hispanic electorate’s demographic subgroups, as detailed in the following sections. In

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<sup>13</sup> This is a national survey of U.S. voters conducted by the Pew Research Center between August 26, 2024 and September 2, 2024. The sample includes 691 registered Hispanic voters (Lopez & Noe-Bustamante, 2024).

the sections below, we examine the electoral behavior of Hispanic voters with respect to their ancestry or place of origin, as well as the language they speak at home. We also consider the traditional sociodemographic variables of sex, age, education level, economic status, and religious belief.


### 3.2.1. The Hispanic Vote by Ancestry or Place of Origin

As mentioned in the introduction to this study, the Hispanic community is heterogeneous. This is reflected in various sociodemographic variables that characterize this diverse group, including ancestry or place of origin. In a report for The Hispanic Council on Hispanic voting patterns in the 2020 presidential elections, Güenechea and Ureña (2020) caution against treating the Hispanic population as “a monolithic community” and note that the diverse cultural backgrounds of people who share the same ancestry or country of origin are reflected in their electoral attitudes.

Figure 6 illustrates the findings published by the 2024–AEVP (2024)—the only national survey to provide data on the electoral behavior of respondents according to their ancestral or geographic origins in the Hispanic world. This survey divides its sample group into six subgroups: Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, Dominicans, Central Americans, and South Americans.

The most notable statistic illustrated by this graph concerns the Cuban vote. Traditionally, a majority of Cubans vote for the Republican Party, as we discuss in more detail in the section on voting patterns in the state of Florida, where Cubans are the largest Hispanic subgroup, representing more than 26% of the state’s Hispanic population (U.S. Census Bureau & U.S. Department of Commerce, 2023a).

FIGURE 6  
The Hispanic Electorate's Support for Leading Presidential Candidates by Ancestry or Country of Origin



Source: Authors' own work based on data from the 2024-AEVP (2024).

The 2024-AEVP (2024) also distinguishes between voters born in the United States and voters born in Puerto Rico or other countries. On this point, the data indicate stronger support for the Republican Party among voters born in the United States than those born in the commonwealth or in other countries: 38% of voters born in the U.S. supported Trump; 60% supported Harris. By contrast, only 34% of Hispanics not born in the U.S. voted for Trump, while 35% supported Harris.


### 3.2.2. The Hispanic Vote by Language Spoken at Home

From a sociolinguistic perspective, the variable of home language is certainly the most interesting, yet it is also the least studied. The 2024-AEVP (2024) is the only survey specifically designed to track the electoral behavior of the Hispanic community and is also, therefore, the only poll that takes this variable into account. Respondents are

divided into three categories: those who only speak Spanish at home (SpanHH), bilingual speakers, and those who only speak English at home (EngHH).

As Figure 7 illustrates, the results suggest that Hispanics who speak only English at home are more likely to vote for Donald Trump (41%), while support for the Republican candidate is several percentage points lower among bilingual voters and voters who speak Spanish at home (35% and 37%, respectively).

FIGURE 7  
The Hispanic Electorate’s Support for Donald Trump by Language Spoken at Home



Source: Authors’ own work based on data from the 2024–AEVP (2024).

With respect to respondents’ preferred political party—irrespective of their preferences for presidential candidates—56% of both Hispanic bilingual speakers and Hispanics who speak Spanish at home say that the Democratic Party is better at addressing their main issues of concern, while those who only speak English at home express less support for Democrats in this respect (51%). In general, Hispanic voters who only speak English at home favor Republicans (36%) more than bilingual speakers (32%) and those who speak Spanish at home (32%), suggesting more conservative tendencies among English-speaking households.

In terms of electoral participation, respondents voting for the first time in a general election (13-14%) exhibited similar tendencies across all three subgroups, suggesting that home language does not significantly distinguish the preferences of first-time voters. However, electoral records indicate that 67% of Hispanic voters who speak English at home voted for the first time before 2018, compared to 60% of bilinguals and 64% of voters who speak Spanish at home, suggesting that English-speaking households have a stronger tendency to participate in elections.

Inflation and the cost of living, followed by jobs and employment, are clearly the most important issues across all three subgroups. Healthcare, on the other hand, is apparently more important to voters who speak Spanish at home (32%), followed by bilinguals (26%) and those who speak English at home (20%).

The difference between the three groups is notably pronounced when it comes to the importance of abortion laws and reproductive rights. Hispanics who speak English at home consider this issue more important (29%) than those from bilingual (19%) and Spanish-speaking (15%) households. Furthermore, in response to a question posed specifically to Hispanics in Arizona, Florida, and Nevada, 34% of respondents who only speak Spanish at home indicate that they had voted against pro-abortion laws, while the percentage of bilinguals and English speakers who voted against abortion is substantially lower (25% and 26%, respectively). We should note, however, that the difference at the national level is significantly less, with variations of no more than two percentage points in opposition to federal pro-abortion laws.

With respect to social and economic policies, although support for the construction of 3 million new homes and \$25,000 down-payment subsidies is widespread across all three groups—SpanHH (91%), bilinguals (90%), and EngHH (85%)—respondents who only speak English at home report more opposition (15%), which is possibly attributable to differences in economic status. With regard to immigration reform, voters who speak Spanish at home (92%) and bilinguals (90%) both express strong support for measures that grant permanent legal status to long-term undocumented immigrants, compared to 85% of those who only speak English at home.

These data show how political preferences and positions on social issues vary according to language spoken at home, which is indeed an indicator of social differences that can determine electoral attitudes. Voters who only speak English at home are apparently more critical of certain social measures and express less confidence in Democrats, while those who only speak Spanish at home tend to prioritize inclusive economic and social policies. These observations underscore the importance of considering linguistic differences when formulating political strategies targeting the Hispanic electorate.

### 3.2.3. The Hispanic Vote by Sex


According to the data from the Pew Research Center, Harris is the preferred candidate for both Hispanic women (58%) and Hispanic men (55%). Donald Trump, on the other hand, has the support of 41% of men and 37% of women. These data reflect greater support for Harris among women than among men (Lopez & Noe-Bustamante, 2024).

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This difference between the electoral preferences of Hispanic men and women is accentuated when we examine the data from the other polls consulted for this report.

As Figure 8 shows, all of the surveys indicate significantly stronger support for the Republican candidate among men than among women. The percentage of Hispanic men who support Trump is consistently over 40%, while the percentage of women who favor the Republican candidate never reaches that level, but ranges between 31% and 39%.

FIGURE 8  
The Hispanic Electorate’s Support for the Top Two Presidential Candidates by Sex,  
According to Different Polls



Source: Authors’ own work based on data from AP VoteCast (2024), the NEP (CNN, 2024), the NYT/SC (2024c), the Pew Research Center (Krogstad et al., 2024), and the 2024-AEVP (2024).

According to the NEP estimates, Trump won the majority of the male Hispanic vote, with 54%. Similarly, only one poll found the percentage of male Harris supporters to exceed 55%, and only by one percentage point, while support for the Democratic candidate hovers around 60% among Hispanic women, and even exceeds that figure according to two of the polls.


An interesting point worth mentioning here is that rates of electoral participation are traditionally higher among women than men. This is true across all racial and ethnic subgroups, including Hispanics. In the 2020 elections, 53.7% of Hispanic voters were women and 46.3% were men (Fabina & Scherer, 2022).

### 3.2.4. The Hispanic Vote by Age

According to the Pew Research Center poll, 59% of Hispanic voters under the age of 50 supported Harris, compared to 35% who backed Trump. Among voters over 50, support for the Republican candidate was higher, with 52% of respondents supporting Harris and 45% supporting Trump (Lopez & Noe-Bustamante, 2024).

As detailed in Figure 9, the NEP data, when broken down by age group, shows that support for Trump was particularly high among Hispanic voters between the ages of 50 and 64. In fact, more voters from this age group supported the former president than voted for his opponent (55% for Trump; 44% for Harris) (CNN, 2024).


FIGURE 9  
The Hispanic Electorate's Support for the Top Two Presidential Candidates by Age, According to the NEP Poll



Source: Authors' own work based on data from the NEP (CNN, 2024).

Figure 10 presents data from the 2024-AEVP (2024) poll, which groups respondents into different age groups than those used by the NEP.

FIGURE 10  
The Hispanic Electorate's Support for the Top Two Presidential Candidates by Age,  
According to the 2024-AEVP Poll



Source: Authors' own work based on data from the 2024-AEVP (2024).

As the figure above shows, Hispanics in the 18-39 age bracket report stronger Republican leanings, with 39% voting for Trump and 59% for Harris. Notably, support for Trump among voters aged 40-59 and over 60 did not exceed 40% (34% and 38% in favor of Trump, respectively). Furthermore, the 2024-AEVP reports stronger support for the Republican candidate in the 18-24 age group (45% in favor of Trump) than in the 25-29 age group (43%), although in both cases the majority of voters supported Harris (CNN, 2024). This may indicate a greater pro-Republican tendency among

younger Hispanic voters, especially men—a theme we explore in more detail in the section below.<sup>14</sup>

### 3.2.5. The Hispanic Vote by Sex and Age

Both the 2024–AEVP (2024) and the NEP (CNN, 2024) provide voting data disaggregated by age group and sex. The findings of these surveys indicate that male voters favor the Republican Party more than female voters across all age groups.

Figure 11, presented below, compares the results of both surveys with respect to the male Hispanic vote.

According to the NEP data, presented in the top part of Figure 11, Trump received majority support from Hispanic men in the following age groups: 18-29 (54%), 30-44 (54%), and 45-65 (56%). Only in the over-65 age group do the votes balance out, with 50% favoring Harris and 49% favoring Trump, indicating a slight, one-percentage-point preference for the Democratic candidate (CNN, 2024).

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
The 2024–AEVP survey, on the other hand, reports majority support for the Democratic Party among Hispanic men, as illustrated in the bottom part of Figure 11. Moreover, the youngest age group—voters between the ages of 18 and 39—registered the strongest support for the Republican candidate, with 48% favoring Donald Trump and 51% favoring Democratic candidate Kamala Harris.

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
<sup>14</sup> The NYT/SC poll (2024c) also disaggregates data on the Hispanic vote by age, but does not report majority Republican support among any age group. Interestingly, according to the NYT/SC survey, the age group registering the highest level of support for the Republican Party is 30-44 (43% Trump; 48% Harris), not 45-64 (41% Trump; 54% Harris). These findings are based on a survey specifically designed by these institutions to study the voting choices of the country's main minority groups. This poll was conducted between September 29, 2024 and October 6, 2024, and the sample includes 902 Hispanic voters (NYT/SC, 2024c).

FIGURE 11  
Support for the Top Two Presidential Candidates Among Hispanic Men by Age and Gender, According to the NEP and 2024-AEVP Polls

NEP





2024-AEVP



Source: Authors' own work based on data from the NEP (CNN, 2024) and 2024-AEVP (2024).

In contrast, the female Hispanic vote leans predominantly toward the Democrats across all age groups and according to both sources. Figure 12 compares the results of the two exit polls for the female Hispanic vote.

FIGURE 12  
Support for the Top Two Presidential Candidates Among Hispanic Women by Age and Gender, According to the NEP and 2024-AEVP Polls



Source: Authors' own work based on data from the NEP (CNN, 2024) and 2024-AEVP (2024).

According to the NEP, support for Trump only exceeded 40% among Hispanic women aged 45 to 64, reaching 45%, compared to 54% support for the Democratic candidate. Furthermore, both polls indicate that the youngest age group exhibits the greatest discrepancy between male and female voting preferences.

While figures vary significantly from survey to survey, these findings nonetheless suggest a possible trend: Among young Hispanics, who are traditionally and predominantly Democrats, Republicans appear to be gaining ground—especially among young Hispanic men.

### 3.2.6. The Hispanic Vote by Education Level

According to the Pew Research Center data, Harris outperformed Trump among Hispanic voters across all categories for education level (53% vs. 39% among voters who only completed high school; 58% vs. 40% among voters who attended college but did not graduate, and 61% vs. 39% among voters with a college degree) (Lopez & Noe-Bustamante, 2024).

The NEP data indicate that support for the Republican Party is slightly stronger among Hispanics who attended college than among those who did not, although in both cases the majority of voters favored the Democratic candidate: 42% of Hispanics with a college degree voted for Trump and 54% voted for Harris, while 48% of Hispanics without a college degree supported Trump and 51% supported Harris (CNN, 2024).<sup>15</sup>

The NYT/SC polls (2024c) report a slightly lower variation in support for Trump with respect to education level, in addition to less support for the Republican Party in general: 62% of respondents with a college degree voted for Harris and 35% for Trump, while 54% of Hispanics without a college degree voted for Harris and 38% for Trump.

This contrasts with the results of the 2024-AEVP (2024), which do not report any notable differences in electoral attitudes with respect to education level. The poll divides voters into three categories according to highest level of education completed: high school or less, some college, and college graduates. All three groups report majority support for Harris, ranging from 61% to 62%, while support for Trump ranges from 37% to 38%.

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<sup>15</sup> However, when further disaggregating the categories “college degree” and “no college degree,” Hispanics who never attended college or never completed vocational training—as opposed to those who received some higher education but did not graduate—leaned slightly in favor of the Republican candidate (50% voted for Trump and 49% voted for Harris) (CNN, 2024).

With respect to the variable of education level, a study conducted by the Pew Research Center comparing the results of the 2018, 2020, and 2022 federal elections proves interesting. In general, the results of this study show an overall increase in support for the Republican candidate and a corresponding decrease in support for the Democratic candidate, especially among Hispanic voters with college degrees: 21% of Hispanic college graduates voted Republican in 2018; by 2020, that figure had already risen to 29%, and in 2022 support for the Republican candidate among Hispanic voters reached 35% (Hartig et al., 2023, p. 22).

### 3.2.7. The Hispanic Vote by Economic Status

According to the 2024-AEVP (2024), support for the Republican Party was especially high among Hispanics with annual incomes of \$40,000 to \$59,999 and those earning over \$100,000. Among the former group, 39% of respondents reported voting for the Republicans compared to 59% for the Democrats; among the latter group, 40% voted for the Republicans compared to 60% for the Democrats. Hispanics with annual incomes between \$60,000 and \$99,999, as well as those earning less than \$39,999 per year, reported a higher level of support for the Democratic candidate (63% for Harris; 36% for Trump).

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The NEP surveys also include this variable, and their results are consistent with the trend described above: Hispanics with annual incomes below \$50,000 (27% of respondents) as well as those with annual incomes above \$100,000 (34% of the sample group) voted for the Republican Party in greater proportion than the 39% of respondents with annual incomes between \$50,000 and \$99,999 (CNN, 2024).

Studying the voting choices of respondents with respect to their perceptions of the country's economic situation also yields interesting conclusions. Hispanic voters who rate economic conditions as fair or poor are divided between Harris (49%) and Trump (46%) (Lopez & Noe-Bustamante, 2024). On the other hand, the vast majority of voters who rate conditions as good or very good are Harris voters—83% according to the Pew Research Center; 94% according to the NEP (Lopez & Noe-Bustamante, 2024; CNN, 2024).

However, these two sources differ on one point: The NEP data, which suggest higher levels of support for the Republican candidate among Hispanic voters, indicate that the majority of Hispanics who rate the national economy as poor or fair voted for Donald Trump (53% for Trump vs. 45% for Harris).

### 3.2.8. The Hispanic Vote by Religious Belief

The Pew Research Center found that 65% of Protestant Hispanics supported Trump, while Harris won the majority support of Hispanics with no religious affiliation (67%). Harris was also the preferred candidate for 65% of Hispanic Catholics, compared to 34% who favored Trump (Lopez & Noe-Bustamante, 2024). This contrasts with the results from the NEP, which suggest that 53% of Hispanic Catholics planned to vote for Trump, compared to 46% who expressed support for Harris (CNN, 2024).

The results of both polls clearly indicate that Harris was the favored candidate among Hispanics who did not identify as members of a religious community. In fact, according to the NEP, 72% of Hispanic voters with no religious affiliation voted for the Democratic candidate, a higher percentage than reported by the Pew Research Center survey (Lopez & Noe-Bustamante, 2024; CNN, 2024).

## 4. Priorities of Hispanic Voters

### 4.1. *The Economy: A Universal Priority*

The economy stands out as the top priority for Hispanic voters across all subgroups,<sup>16</sup> as deduced from the findings of all sources consulted for this study. There is some variation in the order of priorities, however, in part due to differences in how the surveys formulate their closed-answer questions.

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<sup>16</sup> The concept of the economy is understood here—and in most of the surveys in question—in an all-encompassing sense, to include inflation as well as increases in the cost of food, fuel, and other everyday consumer goods.

According to the Pew Research Center, the economy takes a solid lead in the overall priority ranking, with 85% of Hispanic voters identifying this as their main issue of concern, followed by healthcare (71%), violent crime (62%), gun policy (62%), immigration (59%) and Supreme Court appointments (58%) (Lopez & Noe-Bustamante, 2024).

There is, however, a variation in the order of priorities when comparing Trump supporters and Harris supporters. The top three issues for Hispanics who voted for Trump were the economy (93%), violent crime (73%), and immigration (71%), followed by healthcare (62%), gun policy (55%) and foreign policy (54%) (Lopez & Noe-Bustamante, 2024).

The primary concern for Hispanic Harris supporters was also the economy (80%), followed by health care (78%) and gun policy (66%). Other prominent issues include Supreme Court nominations (65%), racial and ethnic inequality, and climate change (both 61%). Immigration—a key issue for Trump supporters—was only important to 51% of Harris voters, placing it in second-to-last place out of the 10 issues specified in the poll (Lopez & Noe-Bustamante, 2024).

Generally speaking, other Trump and Harris voters in the U.S. also share these priorities, though Hispanic Trump supporters attach less importance to immigration than Trump supporters in general. On the other hand, Hispanic Harris supporters assigned greater importance to the economy (80%) and immigration (51%) than Harris supporters in general. (Lopez & Noe-Bustamante, 2024).

The results of the 2024–AEVP (2024) confirm that the economy and its direct impacts on social wellbeing were of paramount importance for the majority of Hispanic voters. According to this poll, cost of living and inflation were of top concern, with the majority (52%) of respondents selecting this issue over the other two options. This was followed by jobs and the economy, with 36% of those surveyed identifying this issue as their main concern. Economic concerns were particularly important for men between the ages of 18 and 39 (42%), who prioritized this issue slightly more than women and men from other age groups did.

The third most important issue for the Hispanic electorate, according to this poll, was the cost of housing, with 27% of the respondents identifying it as one of their three priority concerns. This issue was especially important for young people (a priority for 29% of Hispanics between the ages of 18 and 39) and for voters without a college education (30%). The fourth most important issue, selected by 25% of the Hispanic sample group, was the cost of healthcare. Voters over 60 were the most likely to choose this issue (31%), followed by women (26%) (2024–AEVP, 2024).

Reproductive rights and abortion were among three issues prioritized by 23% of respondents. This issue is clearly more important for women (28%) than it is for men (16%), and of particular concern for women between the ages of 18 and 39 (32%) (2024–AEVP, 2024), indicating a generational and gendered tendency to attach importance to these rights. Furthermore, abortion was the highest priority for 13% of Hispanics surveyed for the NEP (CNN, 2024) and for 15% of the NYT/SC sample group (2024c). The latter survey also indicates a clear difference between the priorities of men and women with respect to this issue (a priority for 6% of men and 23% of women). It was also the decisive issue for 23% of the youngest age group: voters between the ages of 18 and 29.

#### 4.2. *Voting and Confidence in Candidates*

The areas of the surveys focused on perceptions of a candidate’s ability to handle the issues that voters deem important reveal some interesting patterns. While Harris received the majority of Hispanic votes according to all surveys considered for this study, these same polls suggest that many Hispanic voters considered Trump the candidate most capable of addressing their main issue of concern: the economy. This could be a key motivating factor behind the increase in Republican support among a traditionally Democratic electorate.

The results of AP VoteCast (Associated Press, 2024) suggest that a slight majority of voters trust Trump to manage the economy more than Harris (44% vs. 42%). According to the NEP data, 52% believe that Harris would do a better job, while 47% consider

Trump more competent (CNN, 2024). According to that survey, most Hispanic voters supported the vice president, but those who did not vote for Donald Trump still considered him the candidate best prepared to tackle the issue that is, without question, the top priority for the majority of Hispanic voters.<sup>17</sup>

According to the NEP, 81% of Hispanics who said they faced severe hardship in 2024 as a result of inflation indicated that they voted for Donald Trump. Respondents who said they faced moderate hardship voted preferentially for Harris, although the Republican vote in this category was also quite high (53% for Harris vs. 46% for Trump) (CNN, 2024). In addition, the Pew Research Center reports that 77% of Hispanic respondents rated the country's economic conditions as fair or poor, adding that this perception was more common among Trump supporters (90%) than Harris supporters (66%) (Lopez & Noe-Bustamante, 2024).

AP VoteCast reports, moreover, that 45% of the Hispanic electorate considered Donald Trump more capable of managing immigration than Kamala Harris (40%) (Associated Press, 2024). This could reflect a split in the electorate's perception of immigration policies, with a slight majority of Hispanic voters favoring the Republican candidate's "control and order" approach over the more inclusive position of the Democratic Party. The NEP data give Harris a slightly greater advantage on this issue (49% vs. 47%), but the percentage of those who consider Trump more competent on immigration was still higher than the percentage of those who said that they had voted for him (CNN, 2004).

On the other hand, when respondents were asked to indicate which of the two candidates would manage the healthcare system better, Harris enjoyed a clear advantage over Trump (50% vs. 34%) (Associated Press, 2024). According to the NEP, voters also considered the vice president more capable of managing crime and public safety (CNN, 2024).


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<sup>17</sup> 70% of Hispanics surveyed by the NYT/SC say they have found statements by then-former President Trump offensive. This suggests that figures indicating an increase in Hispanic support for the Republican Party are evidence of the electoral pragmatism of the Hispanic community, especially among Republican voters (NYT/SC, 2024c).

## 5. Population Distribution by State and Mapping the Hispanic Vote in the Ten States Under Consideration

The sections above present an overview of the electoral behavior of Hispanic voters at the national level. However, as previously mentioned, the configuration of the U.S. electoral system and the difference in the relative size of the Hispanic community across different states means that the impact of the Hispanic vote on the outcome of the presidential election varies considerably from state to state. Thus, the influence of the Hispanic vote is much greater, for example, in Texas than it is in Mississippi. Figure 13 maps the distribution of the Hispanic population by state:

FIGURE 13  
Distribution of the Hispanic Population in the United States by State



Source: Authors' own work based on data from the *American Community Survey, ACS 1-Year Supplemental Estimates, Table K200301* (U.S. Census Bureau & U.S. Department of Commerce, 2023c).

The following sections examine the results of the NEP and 2024–AEVP exit polls, as both provide detailed breakdowns of the Hispanic vote across different states. We also consider certain NYT/SC estimates when they provide relevant information on the Hispanic vote.

Before presenting a detailed analysis of each of the states considered for this study, we should again highlight the notable differences in the findings of the two major exit polls. To give the reader a visual sense of what these discrepancies suggest, we have created a map that illustrates the disparities between the two main data sources, which have served as a major reference point in debates about the Hispanic community’s voting behavior in the 2024 U.S. elections.

According to the NEP (see Table 1 below), Trump was the candidate of choice for most Hispanics in five of the ten states considered in this report. Specifically, Trump received majority support from Hispanics in three of the seven swing states (Nevada, North Carolina, and Michigan) and in two of the states with the largest Hispanic populations (Texas and Florida), a fact that has fueled the idea—widely promoted by the media—that the Hispanic vote was decisive in Trump’s victory in those states.

TABLE 1  
Support for Candidates in the Seven Swing States and Two States with Large Hispanic Populations, According to the NEP<sup>18</sup>

Swing States	Kamala Harris	Donald Trump
Arizona	54 %	44 %
Georgia	59 %	41 %
Michigan	37 %	58 %
North Carolina	49 %	50 %
Nevada	47 %	49 %
Pennsylvania	59 %	41 %
Wisconsin	60 %	49.70 %
<b>States with the Largest Hispanic Population</b>		
Florida	42 %	58 %
Texas	45 %	55 %

Source: Authors' own work based on data from the 2024 NEP (CNN, 2024).

In contrast, the 2024–AEVP survey (see Table 2) yields very different results. According to this source, Donald Trump failed to win the majority support of the Hispanic electorate in any of the seven swing states or in Texas. According to this poll, Florida was the only state where a majority of Hispanics voted for Trump, as has traditionally been the case in the state, which has a high percentage of voters of Cuban origin.

<sup>18</sup> Note that the 2024 NEP poll does not collect data on the Hispanic vote in the state of California.


TABLE 2  
 Support for Candidates in the Seven Swing States and the Three States with the  
 Largest Hispanic Populations, According to the 2024–AEVP

Swing States	Kamala Harris	Donald Trump
Arizona	63 %	36 %
Georgia	64 %	35 %
Michigan	64 %	33 %
North Carolina	63 %	35 %
Nevada	64 %	35 %
Pennsylvania	70 %	28 %
Wisconsin	64 %	34 %
<b>States with the Largest Hispanic Population</b>		
California	66 %	33 %
Florida	43 %	56 %
Texas	60 %	38 %

Source: Authors' own work based on data from the 2024–AEVP (UnidosUS, 2024).

The map presented in Figure 14, based on the data in Table 1, offers a clear illustration of the aforementioned notion concerning the Hispanic vote that has been promoted by the media and has shaped public opinion on a global scale. In contrast, the map in Figure 15, based on the data in Table 2, paints a very different picture—one that has yet to permeate public opinion:


FIGURE 14  
 Map of the Hispanic Electorate's Majority Preference for Donald Trump or Kamala Harris in the States Surveyed by the NEP



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Source: Authors' own work based on data from the 2024 NEP (CNN, 2024).

FIGURE 15  
 Map of the Hispanic Electorate's Majority Preference for Donald Trump or Kamala Harris in the States Surveyed by the 2024-AEVP



Source: Authors' own work based on data from the 2024-AEVP (UnidosUS, 2024).

Therefore, in the detailed analysis presented in the sections below, we will attempt to indicate, whenever possible, the differences between these two available data sources.

Sections 6 and 7 of this study focus on ten states where the Hispanic vote can play a decisive role in determining the outcomes of state-level elections and, consequently, the results of the national election. Our aim is to assess whether Hispanic voting preferences differ significantly from those of the general electorate as outlined in the sections above.

Section 6 examines the Hispanic vote in California, Texas, and Florida—states with a high percentage of Hispanic voters and significant influence in the U.S. electoral system. Section 7 addresses the Hispanic vote in the 2024 presidential election’s seven swing states: Arizona, Nevada, Pennsylvania, Georgia, North Carolina, Michigan, and Wisconsin.

One key finding is that, according to the estimates of the main sources consulted for this study, the Hispanic vote was not a decisive factor in Donald Trump’s 2024 presidential victory in any of the ten key states examined for this report. In fact, if Hispanic voters in the seven swing states<sup>19</sup> and the three states with the highest Hispanic populations in the country had not participated in the election at all, the results would have remained unchanged. Even in Florida,<sup>20</sup> where Trump enjoyed

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<sup>19</sup> To illustrate these calculations, consider the example of Michigan—a swing state with the highest ratio of Hispanic Trump supporters to total Hispanic population. There were approximately 310,000 registered Hispanic voters in Michigan as of the 2024 election. Assuming a turnout of 54%—equivalent to the rate for 2020, a record year—some 167,400 Hispanics would have exercised their right to vote. In principle, this figure could have been enough to reverse Trump’s victory, given that he won the state by a margin of 80,618 votes (Politico, 2024f). According to the data published by the NEP, 58% of Hispanic voters in Michigan supported the Republican candidate, meaning that 97,092 votes were cast in favor of Trump compared to 70,308 for Kamala Harris or other candidates—a difference of 26,784 votes in favor of Trump. Assuming that the entire Hispanic electorate had abstained from voting, the absence of these votes would not have been enough to alter the electoral outcome in the state. In such a scenario, subtracting the difference attributed to the Hispanic vote (26,784) from Trump’s initial margin of victory (80,618), the Republican candidate’s lead in the state would have been reduced to 53,834 votes. Consequently, Trump would have still won Michigan’s 15 electoral votes, which confirms that the Hispanic vote, even in a state with considerable Hispanic support for Trump, was not a determining factor in the state-level electoral results.

<sup>20</sup> In the case of Florida—the state with the highest percentage of Hispanic Trump voters of the three states with the largest Hispanic populations in the country—the Hispanic electorate accounts for approximately 3,500,000 eligible voters. Assuming a turnout rate of 54%, an estimated 1,890,000 Hispanic voters would have cast a ballot

especially strong support among Hispanic voters, his victory would not have been reversed in favor of Kamala Harris.

This conclusion is based on calculations derived from various sources. First, we used estimates on the Hispanic electorate in each state provided by the Pew Research Center (Krogstad et al., 2024). We also took into account the Hispanic vote percentages reported by the National Election Pool (CNN, 2024), using the data that reflected the highest level of Hispanic support for the Republican Party, as a methodological precaution. In addition, we assumed a Hispanic voter turnout rate of 54% (the record figure reported for the 2020 elections) as well as official data on the victory margins reported for each state (Politico 2024a, 2024b, 2024c, 2024d, 2024e, 2024f, & 2024g). Calculations were performed for each of the ten states analyzed in this report and, while our results are approximations, in no case was the Hispanic vote remotely close to deciding the results at the state level.

38 This does not mean that, in some hypothetical scenario characterized by significantly higher Hispanic turnout and substantially more favorable conditions for the Democratic Party, the electoral outcome could not have been different. But that line of reasoning falls within the realm of counterfactual speculation. The key point is that, according to available estimates, the Hispanic vote did not play a decisive role in Trump’s victory in 2024, contradicting the claims of numerous media outlets and, consequently, the dominant narrative conveyed to the public.

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in 2024. According to the NEP data, 58% of these voters supported Donald Trump—the equivalent of approximately 1,096,200 votes—while the remaining 793,800 votes went to Kamala Harris or other candidates, representing a difference of 302,400 votes in favor of Trump. However, even if the entire Hispanic electorate in Florida had abstained from voting, the absence of these votes would not have been enough to alter the electoral outcome in the state. Trump won by a margin of 1,428,659 votes (Politico, 2024d), so even if we subtract the difference attributed to the Hispanic vote (302,400), he would have still beat Harris by 1,126,259 votes. As a result, the Republican candidate would have also secured Florida’s 30 electoral votes, confirming that, despite the Hispanic community’s strong support for Trump in Florida, the votes of this demographic were not a decisive factor in the state’s electoral outcome.

## 6. The Hispanic Vote in States with the Largest Populations

### 6.1. California

The state of California has the highest number of Hispanic voters and the second largest percentage of the Hispanic electorate in the country. It is also the state with the most votes in the Electoral College system: In 2024, California was allotted a total of 54 electoral votes (National Archives and Records Administration, 2025).

Kamala Harris won California in 2024 with 58.5% of the vote. Trump, meanwhile, received 38.3% (BBC News, 2024). Because the state has consistently leaned Democrat since 1992—in large part due to its predominantly Democratic Hispanic electorate (270toWin, n.d.-b)—most election polls do not study the state’s voting dynamics in detail. Only the 2024–AEVP, which focuses on collecting representative data on minority voting in 2024, provides figures on the Hispanic vote in California, a state that is home to a quarter of the country’s Hispanic population, 80% of whom are of Mexican descent (Krogstad et al., 2024; U.S. Census Bureau & U.S. Department of Commerce, 2023a).


The 2024–AEVP poll registered majority support for the Democratic candidate among Hispanic voters in that year’s presidential election (66% in favor of Harris; 33% in favor of Trump). When comparing this data with the national average reported by the survey (62% for Harris and 37% for Trump), we can deduce that the Hispanic vote in California is significantly more favorable to Democrats than it is at the national level, by a difference of 4 percentage points (UnidosUS, 2024).

However, as Figure 16 shows, when we compare the poll’s 2024 findings with the analogous data for 2020, there is a considerable shift in partisan preference in favor of the Republican Party; in 2020, Biden received 75% of the Hispanic vote and Trump received 22% (UnidosUS, 2024).<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> While the NEP did not provide disaggregated data on voting in California in 2024, it did in 2020. That year, results indicated 75% Hispanic support for Biden and 23% for Trump (CNN, 2020), numbers similar to those published by the AEVP.

FIGURE 16  
The Hispanic Vote in California: 2020 and 2024



40

Source: Authors' own work based on AEVP data from 2020 and 2024 (UnidosUS, 2024).

We can thus conclude that the Hispanic vote in California remains predominantly Democratic, with a lower percentage of support for the Republican candidate than the national average.

### 6.1.1. The Hispanic Vote in California by Language Spoken at Home

The 2024-AEVP is the only poll that considers language spoken at home. In the case of California, the data do not suggest a notable difference between the voting choices of Hispanics who speak Spanish at home (66% for Trump; 33% for Harris) and those who speak English at home (64% for Harris; 35% for Trump). The analogous 2020 survey also does not indicate a difference with respect to this variable (United States, 2024).


### 6.1.2. The Hispanic Vote in California by Sex

In line with the national trend, California has seen an increase in Republican support among both men and women, with men registering a higher percentage of support for the Republican candidate.

According to data from the 2024-AEVP, there is a 10-percentage-point difference between the male and female Hispanic vote: 60% of Hispanic men supported Harris and 39% supported Trump, while 70% of women voted for the Democratic candidate and 29% supported the Republican candidate (UnidosUS, 2024).

Figure 17 compares these findings with the data for 2020, revealing some notable variations.

FIGURE 17  
Change in the Hispanic Vote in California by Sex: 2020 and 2024



Source: Authors' own work based on AEVP data from 2020 and 2024 (UnidosUS, 2024)

In 2020, Biden received 72% of the male Hispanic vote while Trump received only 27%. According to this source, the Republican candidate improved his performance among Hispanic men in California by 12 percentage points between 2020 and 2024. Party


preference among female Hispanic voters experienced a similar variation: in 2020, 78% voted for Biden and 18% for Trump (UnidosUS, 2024).

### 6.1.3. The Hispanic Vote in California by Age

According to data from 2024–AEVP, the Republican Party received greater support from Hispanics between the ages of 18 and 39 (60% for Harris; 39% for Trump) than from those over 40 (70% for Harris; 29% for Trump) (UnidosUS, 2024).

If we compare these data with the findings from the analogous survey for 2020, as illustrated in Figure 18, we can see that support for Trump was also higher among the 18-to-39 age group (70% for Biden; 27% for Trump) than among voters over 40 (79% for Biden; 17% for Trump) (UnidosUS, 2024). Similarly, support for the Republican candidate was notably lower in 2020 than it was in 2024. From this comparison, we can deduce a roughly 10-percentage-point shift in the Hispanic vote in favor of the Republican Party.


FIGURE 18  
Change in the Hispanic Vote in California by Age: 2020 and 2024



Source: Authors' own work based on AEVP data from 2020 and 2024 (UnidosUS, 2024)

The 2024–AEVP also provides data on the partisan preferences of Hispanics in California based on their status as naturalized or U.S.-born citizens. As Figure 19 shows, 63% of Hispanic voters born in the U.S. voted for Harris and 35% for Trump, while 71% of naturalized citizens voted for Harris and 29% for Trump (UnidosUS, 2024).

FIGURE 19  
The Hispanic Vote in California: Naturalized Citizens vs. Citizens Born in the U.S.



Source: Authors’ own work based on 2024 data–AEVP (UnidosUS, 2024).

Note that the difference in the voting preferences of these two subgroups is consistent with the difference observed when examining voting preferences by age group. This is due to a partial overlap between the “youth population” and “U.S.-born” voting groups on the one hand, and the “older population” and “naturalized citizens” groups on the other.

#### 6.1.4. The Hispanic Vote in California by Education Level

According to the 2024–AEVP, there is a notable difference between the electoral behavior of Hispanics who do not have college educations and those who do. In 2024, support for the Republican Party was 8 percentage points higher among Hispanics who did not graduate college (63% in favor of Harris; 36% in favor of Trump) than it was among those with university degrees (72% in favor of Harris; 28% in favor of Trump) (UnidosUS, 2024).

This difference is not reflected in the data from the 2020 presidential election, when 75% of Hispanic voters—those who had college degrees as well as those who did not—voted for Biden. In fact, support for Trump among Hispanics with no higher education was lower than it was among who had university degrees (21% and 24%, respectively) (UnidosUS, 2024).

We can therefore conclude that, in California, the redistribution of votes in favor of the Republican Party is especially pronounced among Hispanics with no higher education.

#### 6.1.5. The Hispanic Vote in California and Family Economics

The 2024–AEVP provides a list of issues and asks respondents to indicate the three that they believe merit the most attention from politicians. Not surprisingly, the priority issues for Hispanics in California were, in this order: cost of living and inflation (50%), jobs and the economy (38%), housing costs and affordability (30%). All of these issues fall within the top area of concern for Hispanics both in California and nationally: family finances.


### 6.2. Texas

Texas is a decisive state in the battle for the presidency. In 2024, the Republican candidate’s victory in Texas added 40 electoral votes to the party’s total. In fact, Texas is the state with the second highest number of electoral votes after California (National Archives and Records Administration, 2025). In 2024, Trump won the state with 56.1% of the vote, while Harris received 42.5% (BBC News, 2024).

Since 1980, Texas has consistently voted for Republican presidential candidates. In the last elections, support for Trump increased by 4 percentage points compared to the 2020 and 2016 elections (52.1% and 52.2%, respectively), suggesting a return to the pattern established by the four presidential elections that took place between 2000 and 2012, when the Republican majority ranged from 55.2% to 61.1% (270toWin, n.d.-f).

There are approximately 6.5 million Hispanic voters in Texas, of whom almost 80% are of Mexican origin or descent (U.S. Census Bureau & U.S. Department of Commerce, 2023a). Hispanics make up 32% of the state’s electorate, so their vote can prove decisive (Krogstad et al., 2024). To assess the electoral behavior of Hispanics in Texas and determine whether these voters contributed to the growth in support for the Republican Party in 2024, we have once again consulted the state-level results of the NEP<sup>22</sup> and the 2024–AEVP, as well as data from a poll conducted by the NYT/SC<sup>23</sup> (2024b) specifically focused on Texas. Figure 20 summarizes the results of the two exit polls:

FIGURE 20  
Hispanic Support for Candidates in Texas According to the NEP and 2024–AEVP



Source: Authors’ own work based on data from the NEP (CNN, 2024) and the 2024–AEVP (UnidosUS, 2024).

<sup>22</sup> In the case of Texas, the 2024 NEP data are based on a sample of 641 Hispanic voters (CNN, 2024). The 2020 NEP data for this same state is based on a sample of 1,154 Hispanic voters (CNN, 2020).

<sup>23</sup> The NYT/SC (2024b) survey for Texas was conducted between September 29, 2024 and October 4, 2024, using a sample of 180 Hispanic voters.

The NEP data, represented in the sector diagram on the left, suggests that the Hispanic vote contributed significantly to Trump’s improved performance in 2024 vis-à-vis the previous two elections, when he also ran as the Republican Party’s presidential candidate. According to this poll, in 2024, Trump was the preferred candidate for 55% of Hispanics living in Texas, while 45% voted for Harris (CNN, 2024). This majority Hispanic support for the Republican Party stands in stark contrast to the Democratic majority reported by the analogous survey conducted for the 2020 elections, which reported that 58% of Hispanics in Texas said they had voted for Biden, while only 41% said they had voted for Trump (CNN, 2020). This would represent a 14-percentage-point increase in support for the Republican candidate and a drop of 13 points for the Democrats.

The 2024–AEVP and NYT/SC polls yield remarkably different results, reporting majority support for Vice President Kamala Harris among Hispanics in Texas. The 2024–AEVP indicates 60% Hispanic support for Harris and 38% for Trump, as shown in the pie chart on the right. However, when we compare these results with the analogous data for 2020, there is a considerable redistribution of the Hispanic vote in favor of the Republican Party (in 2020, the AEVP reported 67% support for Biden and 29% for Trump) (UnidosUS, 2024). That said, according to the 2024–AEVP, support for Trump in Texas was only one percentage point higher than the national average.


The NYT/SC (2024b) survey, meanwhile, found that a simple majority of 49% favored Vice President Kamala Harris, while 43% supported Donald Trump. Unlike the 2024–AEVP, the NYT/SC (2024b) findings coincide with the NEP data, indicating significantly higher Hispanic support for the Republican Party in Texas than at the national level (according to this poll, support for Trump in the state was 6 points above the national average, and support for Harris was 7 points below it).

### 6.2.1. The Hispanic Vote in Texas by Language Spoken at Home

In the case of Texas, the 2024–AEVP data suggest a notable difference in the electoral attitudes of Hispanics with respect to the language they speak at home (see Figure 21). This poll reports stronger support for the Democratic Party among Hispanics who speak Spanish at home (63% for Harris; 35% for Trump), but suggests that the

distribution of the Hispanic vote among respondents who speak English at home is more balanced (51% for Harris; 48% for Trump) (UnidosUS, 2024).

FIGURE 21  
The Hispanic Vote in Texas by Language Spoken at Home




Source: Authors' own work based on data from the 2024-AEVP (UnidosUS, 2024).

The analogous survey for 2020 reflects a similar difference, in addition to showing a considerable redistribution of Hispanic support in favor of the Republican Party across both groups, but especially among Hispanics who speak English in the home: In 2020, 71% of Hispanics who indicated Spanish as their home language voted for Biden and 27% voted for Trump, while 66% of respondents who indicated English as their home language voted for Biden and 30% for Trump (UnidosUS, 2024).

### 6.2.2. The Hispanic Vote in Texas by Sex

In line with the voting patterns of the general electorate, the Republican Party enjoyed more support from Hispanic men than Hispanic women. However, in this section as with others, different polls produced very different results, as shown in Figure 22, which illustrates the percentage support for the top two candidates among Hispanic men, according to both polls.

FIGURE 22  
 Support for Candidates Among Hispanic Men in Texas, According to the NEP and  
 2024–AEVP Polls




Source: Authors' own work based on data from the NEP (CNN, 2024) and 2024–AEVP (UnidosUS, 2024).

48 According to the poll conducted by the NEP, Trump received 65% of the male vote, while support for Harris did not exceed 35% (CNN, 2024). However, according to the 2024–AEVP, the majority of both Hispanic men and women voted for the Democratic candidate. In the case of men, 54% voted for Harris and 45% for Trump (UnidosUS, 2024).

When we compare the 2024 NEP data with the analogous findings for 2020, there are some notable variations. In 2020, Joe Biden received majority support from Hispanic men in Texas, winning 54% of the male vote, compared to Trump's 44% (CNN, 2020). Contrasting this data with the figures for 2024 suggests a notable, 21-percentage-point increase in support for Trump among Hispanic men in Texas.

With respect to the state's female vote, Figure 23 illustrates support for each candidate among Hispanic women.

FIGURE 23  
Support for Candidates Among Hispanic Women in Texas, According to the NEP and 2024–AEVP



Source: Authors' own work based on data from the NEP (CNN, 2024) and 2024–AEVP (UnidosUS, 2024).

The results of the NEP suggest a significant difference between the male and female Hispanic vote in Texas. According to this source, most women favored the vice president (58%), though female support for Trump in the state (41%) slightly exceeded the national average recorded by the NEP (39%) (CNN, 2024). The 2024–AEVP indicates a significantly more pro-Democratic female vote. According to this source, 66% of Hispanic women voted for Harris and 32% for Trump (UnidosUS, 2024). Likewise, the poll also reflects a significant difference of more than 10 percentage points in the distribution of votes by sex, verifying this general pattern.

Since the 2020 elections, the voting preferences of Hispanic women have changed less than they have for Hispanic men. According to the NEP, 60% of Hispanic women voted for Biden in 2020 while 38% voted for Trump (CNN, 2020). These variations, though indicating an increase in the Republican vote among Hispanic women, are overshadowed by the redistribution of the Hispanic male vote that we can deduce from the findings of the NEP.

According to the 2024–AEVP, relative to the 2020 elections, the Republican vote increased considerably among both men and women. In 2020, 59% of Hispanic male

respondents voted for Biden and 37% for Trump, while 75% of Hispanic women supported Biden and 21% supported Trump (UnidosUS, 2024).

Interestingly, the AEVP reports a slightly greater increase in support for Trump among Hispanic women than Hispanic men, contrasting with the results obtained by comparing the findings of the NEP.

In addition to the fact that the Hispanic vote has shifted toward the Republican Party and that Hispanic men tend to vote Republican more than Hispanic women, our most striking finding in this regard is the significant difference between the results of these two surveys: In the case of Hispanic voters in Texas, the NEP suggests that their majority support for the Republican Party is significantly higher than the national average, which, if true, would have contributed to the Republicans consolidating a majority in the state. On the other hand, the 2024–AEVP reports majority Hispanic support for Harris that does not deviate significantly from the national average.

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### 6.2.3. The Hispanic Vote in Texas by Age


According to the results of the NEP, the Republican Party enjoys especially strong support among younger Hispanic voters, as illustrated in Figure 24.

The NEP reports that 67% of Hispanics between the ages of 18 and 29 voted for Trump, while 32% supported Harris. In the 30-to-39 age group, both candidates received 50% of votes. Hispanic respondents between the ages of 40 and 49, meanwhile, favored Donald Trump, who received 66% of their vote, compared to Harris’s 34%, while Hispanics aged 50 to 64,<sup>24</sup> on the other hand, mostly supported Harris, registering 53% support (CNN, 2024).

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<sup>24</sup> The NEP does not provide data on Hispanic respondents over the age of 65 (13% of the sample group), probably because the figures are not sufficiently representative.

FIGURE 24  
The Hispanic Vote in Texas by Age, According to the NEP




Source: Authors' own work based on data from the NEP (CNN, 2024).

If we group respondents into only two age groups—18 to 44 and over 45—we can see that a solid majority of younger voters prefer the Republican candidate (61% for Trump; 39% for Harris), while support for both candidates is more balanced among voters over the age of 45. Among voters in this age bracket, Harris enjoyed a slight 52% majority over Trump's 47% (CNN, 2024).

When comparing these figures with the data from the 2020 NEP, two findings stand out: First, the Democratic candidate received majority support across all age groups in 2020. Second, the age group that reported the strongest support for the Democratic Party at the time (71% for Biden vs. 27% for Trump) was the 18-29 bracket—the same age group that would register the strongest support for Trump in 2024 (CNN, 2020). These findings evidence growing support for the Republican Party among Hispanic youth in Texas, a trend that holds true for the Hispanic electorate nationwide.

Data from the 2024–AEVP, presented in Figure 25, support this conclusion, though the poll suggests notably less support for the Republican Party, and in no case does it report majority support for Trump.

FIGURE 25  
The Hispanic Vote in Texas by Age, According to the 2024–AEVP



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
Source: Authors' own work based on data from the 2024–AEVP (UnidosUS, 2024).

According to this poll, 57% of Hispanics in the 18-39 age group voted for Harris and 41% voted for Trump, while 63% of respondents over the age of 40 voted for Harris and 36% voted for Trump (UnidosUS, 2024). This suggests a difference of 5 percentage points in the distribution of the vote of both age groups.

In line with the NEP, the AEVP reports a significant redistribution of the vote in favor of the Republican Party among younger voters. In 2020, support for Democrats was still stronger among Hispanics aged 18 to 39 (68% for Biden; 27% for Trump) than it was among voters over 40 (67% for Biden; 31% for Trump) (UnidosUS, 2024).

As Figure 26 shows, there is also a considerable difference between the voting preferences of U.S.-born Hispanic citizens and naturalized Hispanic citizens in Texas.

FIGURE 26  
The Hispanic Vote in Texas: Naturalized vs. U.S.-born Citizens



Source: Authors' own work based on data from the 2024-AEVP (UnidosUS, 2024).

In 2024, 58% of voters born in the U.S. supported Harris and 41% supported Trump. Naturalized citizens, on the other hand, favored the Democratic Party by a difference of 15 percentage points compared to Hispanic voters who were born in the country (UnidosUS, 2024). As with the case of California, the difference between these two groups is consistent—though not coincident—with the difference observed when examining voting preferences by age group.

#### 6.2.4. The Hispanic Vote in Texas by Education Level

According to the 2024 NEP, Trump is the preferred candidate among Hispanics without college degrees (57%, compared to 42% for Harris). The majority of respondents with university educations, on the other hand, voted for the Democratic candidate (51%, compared to 49% for Trump) (CNN, 2024). This contrasts with the results from 2020, which reflect majority support for Democrats across both groups, with 58% of Hispanics without college educations voting for Biden and 40% supporting Trump. Support for Democrats was also higher among Hispanics with college educations: in 2020, 55% favored Biden while 43% voted for Trump (CNN, 2020).

Once again, the 2024–AEVP produced significantly different results: According to this poll, in 2024, 60% of Hispanics without college degrees voted for Harris, while only 38% voted for Trump. Furthermore, this source does not report a notable difference in the electoral choices of Hispanics with respect to higher education: 60% of Hispanics with a university education also supported Harris, while 39% supported Trump (UnidosUS, 2024).

With respect to the 2020 results, the AEVP—like the NEP—shows a considerable shift in the voting choices of Hispanics without college degrees, to the detriment of the Democrats (in 2020, Biden received 71% of the vote and Trump received 25%). However, this survey also suggests a slight increase in support for the Democrats among college-educated Hispanics in Texas, 57% of whom voted for Biden and 40% for Trump in 2020 (UnidosUS, 2024).

#### 6.2.5. The Hispanic Vote in Texas and Family Economics

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According to the data published by the NEP, 52% of Hispanics in Texas believe that their family’s financial situation has worsened over the past four years. Of these, 89% voted for Trump and 11% for Harris. Once again, the data suggest that a majority of Hispanics who are dissatisfied with their economic situations believe that Trump’s policies will have a positive impact on their family finances. Furthermore, 70% of Hispanics surveyed indicated that the country’s economic situation is “fair or bad.” Among respondents who shared this perception, 76% said they had voted for Trump (CNN, 2024).

According to the NYT/SC poll (2024b), as many as 82% of Hispanics in the U.S. are dissatisfied with the economy. This same poll reports that the economy is also by far the main issue of concern for Hispanic voters in Texas (25%), followed by immigration and abortion (both at 17%).

The 2024–AEVP data confirm that the priority issues for Hispanic voters in Texas are consistent with those of the national electorate: The three priority issues indicated by respondents were cost of living and inflation (53%), jobs and the economy (34%), and cost of healthcare (28%) (UnidosUS, 2024).

### 6.3. Florida

Florida is another key state in the presidential race. With 30 electoral votes, it is the third most influential state in the Electoral College system, surpassed only by California and Texas (National Archives and Records Administration, 2025). In the 2024 presidential elections, Florida once again voted for Donald Trump, who won the state with 56.1% of the vote, compared to Harris's 43% (BBC News, 2024).

Historically, election trends in Florida have proven less predictable than in states like California or Texas, and have alternated between Republican and Democratic presidential victories. Nevertheless, Donald Trump won the state in both 2016 and 2020. In 2024, Trump's margin of victory increased by several percentage points compared to the 51.2% he received in 2020 or the 49% he won in 2016, thus indicating an increase in the Republican vote in the state (270toWin, n.d.-c).


The NEP data,<sup>25</sup> represented in the diagram on the left of Figure 27, suggest that Hispanics in Florida exhibit a notable preference for Trump, who received 58% of their votes, compared to Harris's 42% (CNN, 2024). This majority support for the Republican candidate in Florida differs from the national average reported by this same survey. According to this source, support for Trump among Hispanics in Florida is 12 percentage points above the national average, while support for Harris was 9 points below it.

In the case of Florida, the 2024-AEVP figures are similar to those recorded by the NEP (see the diagram on the right of Figure 27). According to this poll, Trump won the support of 56% of Florida's Hispanic voters, while Harris received 43% (UnidosUS, 2024).

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<sup>25</sup> In the case of Florida, the 2024 NEP findings are based on a sample of 637 Hispanic voters (CNN, 2024). The 2020 NEP data for this same state are based on a sample of 1,150 Hispanic voters (CNN, 2020).

FIGURE 27  
Hispanic Support for Candidates in Florida, According to the NEP and 2024–AEVP



Source: Authors' own work based on data from the NEP (CNN, 2024) and 2024–AEVP (UnidosUS, 2024).

56 Both sources indicate, moreover, that the Hispanic vote in Florida leans significantly in favor of Republicans when compared to the national average, a phenomenon already observed and described in the context of previous presidential elections (see Güenechea & Ureña, 2020, pp. 35-37).

Furthermore, the results of both polls suggest a shift in the political dynamics of Florida's Hispanic electorate with respect to the 2020 elections. Both sources show that Florida's Hispanic community, though more pro-Republican than in other states, voted overwhelmingly for the Democratic Party in 2020. According to the NEP, 53% of Hispanics in Florida supported Biden and 46% backed Trump (CNN, 2020). The findings of the 2024–AEVP suggest an even greater redistribution of the vote. According to this poll, in 2020, 59% of Hispanics in Florida voted for Biden and 38% voted for Trump (UnidosUS, 2024). This would suggest that from 2020 to 2024, Trump improved his performance by 18 percentage points.

### 6.3.1. The Hispanic Vote in Florida by Ancestry or Place of Origin


The most widely discussed topic regarding the Hispanic vote in Florida is, without a doubt, the significant difference in voting behavior with respect to ancestry or place of

origin. In particular, the electoral preferences of the Cuban community are often juxtaposed with those of other Hispanic groups, especially Puerto Ricans.

With respect to nationality of place of origin, Cubans and Puerto Ricans represent the two largest subgroups within the state's Hispanic population. Cubans in Florida number over 1.6 million (7.2% of the state's population) (U.S. Census Bureau & U.S. Department of Commerce, 2023a) and constitute a key voting bloc for the Republican Party. Puerto Ricans, meanwhile, number over 1.2 million (5.4% of the population) (U.S. Census Bureau & U.S. Department of Commerce, 2023a) and represent the traditional voting base of the Democrats, although the 2024 election results suggest that the party is facing more competition with respect to this group of voters.

In the case of Cubans, support for the Republican Party intensified in 2024, consolidating this demographic's historical tendency. According to the findings of the NEP, in 2020, Trump received 56% of the Cuban vote while Biden received 42%—figures that already reflect a clear preference for the Republican Party. However, in 2024, Trump widened his lead, receiving 70% of the Cuban vote, while Harris only received 30% (CNN, 2020 and 2024). This 14-percentage-point increase in support for Trump, combined with a 12-percentage-point drop for the Democrats, reinforces the perception of Cubans as a solidly Republican voting bloc in Florida. The AEVP reports very similar figures, as reflected in Figure 28. As the graph shows, 67% of Cubans in Florida voted for the Republicans, while 31% voted for the Democrats. This reflects a 12-point increase in support for Trump when compared to 2020, when he received 55% of the Cuban vote and Biden received 42% (UnidosUS, 2024).

FIGURE 28  
The Hispanic Vote in Florida by Ancestry or Country of Origin, According to the 2024-AEVP



Source: Authors' own work based data from the 2024-AEVP (UnidosUS, 2024).

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Support for the Democratic Party has also decreased among Puerto Ricans, though a majority continue to favor the party. The results of the NEP indicate that Biden received 57% of the Puerto Rican vote in 2020, compared to 41% for Trump. In 2024, Harris received 53% while support for Trump rose to 45% (CNN, 2020 & 2024). This represents a 4-percentage-point loss for the Democrats and a 4-point increase for the Republicans, suggesting that the general trend in favor of Republicans applies to this group of Hispanic voters as well.


Nevertheless, as shown in the graph above, the AEVP reports that Puerto Ricans in Florida continue to favor the Democratic Party. According to this poll, 57% voted for Kamala Harris and 42% for Donald Trump (UnidosUS, 2024). Likewise, compared to the NEP, the AEVP suggests a more significant shift in the Puerto Rican vote from 2020 to 2024. According to the AEVP, in 2020 Biden won 71% of the Puerto Rican vote, while Trump only received 26% (UnidosUS, 2024). This represents a redistribution of approximately 15 percentage points in favor of the Republican candidate.

Additionally, the 2024–AEVP publishes data on the electoral behavior of Hispanics who are neither Cuban nor Puerto Rican, grouping these voters into the categories of “South American” and “Central American.” For these groups of voters, the poll reports majority support for Republicans, with 62% favoring Trump and 37% supporting Harris (UnidosUS, 2024).

### 6.3.2. The Hispanic Vote in Florida by Language Spoken at Home

With respect to language spoken at home, the 2024–AEVP reports a higher percentage of Republican support among Hispanics who say they speak Spanish at home, compared to respondents who indicated that their predominant home language is English, as shown in Figure 29:

FIGURE 29  
Support for Candidates in Florida by Language Spoken at Home



Source: Authors’ own work based on data from the 2024–AEVP (UnidosUS, 2024).

As the graph shows, 57% of Hispanics in Florida who indicated Spanish as their home language voted for Trump, while 41% voted for Harris. On the other hand, 51% of respondents who said that they spoke mainly English at home supported the Republican candidate, while 48% supported the vice president (UnidosUS, 2024).

This phenomenon is also reflected in the data for 2020, when Trump received the support of 47% of Hispanics who indicated that they speak Spanish at home and only 32% from respondents who indicated English as their home language, while Joe Biden registered 51% and 64% support, respectively (UnidosUS, 2024).

Regarding changes in voting habits since 2020, in addition to both subgroups demonstrating a stronger preference for the Republican Party, there has also been a tendency toward homogenization: the difference in partisan preference according to language spoken at home decreased from approximately 14 points in 2020 to approximately 7 points in 2024.


### 6.3.3. The Hispanic Vote in Florida by Sex

In accordance with the national trend, the Republican Party received more support in Florida among Hispanic men than it did among Hispanic women.

Figure 30 shows the percentage of support received by each candidate among Hispanic men in Florida, according to the two main polls. The results of the NEP indicate that 63% of men voted for Trump, while 37% favored Harris (CNN, 2024). The 2024-AEVP survey, meanwhile, reports 59% support for Trump among Hispanic men and 40% for Harris (UnidosUS, 2024).

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
FIGURE 30  
Support for Candidates Among Hispanic Men in Florida, According to the NEP and 2024-AEVP



Source: Authors' own work based on data from the NEP (CNN, 2024) and 2024-AEVP (UnidosUS, 2024).

We should note that, according to both polls, Trump was also the preferred candidate of the majority of Hispanic women in Florida, as shown in Figure 31:

FIGURE 31  
Support for the Candidates Among Hispanic Women in Florida, According to the NEP and 2024-AEVP



Source: Authors' own work based on data from the NEP (CNN, 2024) and 2024-AEVP (UnidosUS, 2024).


According to the NEP, 52% of women voted for Trump and 46% for Harris (CNN, 2024). The 2024-AEVP reports similar findings: 53% of women voted for Trump and 45% for Harris (UnidosUs, 2024).

When we compare these results with the analogous data for 2020, there is a significant observable change in voting behavior: both surveys suggest that Biden received majority support from male as well as female Hispanic voters in 2020. According to the NEP, in 2020, 52% of men voted for Biden and 46% for Trump, while 53% of women voted for Biden and 45% for Trump (CNN, 2020). According to the AEVP, in 2020, 59% of Hispanic men voted for Biden and 39% for Trump, while 59% of Hispanic women also voted for Biden, and 38% for Trump (UnidosUS, 2024). This indicates a clear shift toward the Republican party among Hispanic voters of both sexes in 2024.

### 6.3.4. The Hispanic Vote in Florida by Age

In terms of voting and age, the results of the NEP (2024) suggest that support for Trump increases in tandem with the age of voters, as shown in Figure 32.

FIGURE 32  
The Hispanic Vote in Florida by Age, According to the NEP



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Source: Authors' own work based on data from the NEP (CNN, 2024).

Among voters between the ages of 18 and 29, Harris led with 53%, compared to Trump's 46%, but she lost her lead among voters aged 30-44, who supported Trump by 53% and Harris by 45%. In the 45-64 age group, Republican support was even higher, with 63% of respondents voting for Trump and 37% for Harris. This trend reached its peak with the over-65 group, with 65% of respondents voting for Trump and 34% for Harris (CNN, 2024).

Comparing these figures with the data for 2020 evidences another substantial change. In the 2020 elections, Biden was the preferred candidate across all age groups, but especially among young people between the ages of 18 and 29, 64% of whom supported the Democratic candidate compared to 34% who voted for Trump. This reflects an 18-percentage-point increase in support for Trump. In Florida, therefore, we


are also seeing a significant increase in Republican support among young Hispanic voters.

Similarly, there was a notable increase in support for the Republican candidate among voters in the 30-44 and 45-64 age groups, by 8 and 18 percentage points respectively. Voters over the age of 65 reported the most dramatic change, increasing their support for Trump by 20 percentage points compared to 2020 (CNN, 2020 and 2024)

The 2024-AEVP survey, meanwhile, disaggregates Hispanic voters into two age groups: 18-39 and over 40. As Figure 33 shows, the data from this poll do not indicate a notable difference between the voting attitudes of these two age groups.

Hispanics between the ages of 18 and 39 supported Trump by 56% and Harris by 42%. Voters over the age of 40 also supported the Republican candidate by 56%, while 43% voted for Harris (UnidosUS, 2024).

FIGURE 33  
The Hispanic Vote in Florida by Age, According to the 2024-AEVP



Source: Authors' own work based on data from the 2024-AEVP (UnidosUS, 2024).

In 2020, the same poll reported considerably different findings. Neither group indicated majority support for Trump. That year, 64% of Hispanic voters between the ages of 18 and 39 voted for Biden and 33% voted for Trump, while 54% of voters over 40 supported Biden and 43% supported Trump (UnidosUS, 2024). In other words, both surveys report a significant redistribution of the Hispanic vote across all age groups, and to the detriment of the Democratic Party. According to the 2024–AEVP data, this shift is especially pronounced among voters over 40, whose support for the Republican Party increased by 22 percentage points, a finding in line with the figures reported by the NEP, which show a similar trend among Hispanic voters aged 18 to 29.

In the case of Florida, the results of the 2024–AEVP also show no difference between the voting behavior of naturalized Hispanic citizens and voters born in the U.S. (UnidosUS, 2024).

### 6.3.5. The Hispanic Vote in Florida by Education Level

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According to the NEP data, the electoral behavior of Hispanics in Florida varies very slightly according to their level of education. In the 2024 elections, 56% of Hispanics with college educations voted for Trump and 44% voted for Harris. Voters with no college educations, on the other hand, favored the Republican candidate by 58% and the vice president by 41% (CNN, 2024).

When comparing these results with the data for 2020, there is a noticeable decrease in support for the Democrats and a growth in the Republican vote across both subgroups. In 2020, of the 36% of Hispanics who indicated that they had a college education, 55% voted for Biden, while Trump received 43% of their votes. Likewise, among voters with no higher education, Biden led with 53%, compared to 46% who supported Trump (CNN, 2020).

The 2024–AEVP reports similar findings. Data for the 2024 elections show no significant difference between the political preferences of college-educated Hispanics (57% in favor of Trump; 41% in favor of Harris) and Hispanics with no higher education (55% in favor of Trump; 43% in favor of Harris) (UnidosUS, 2024). When we compare this data with the findings from 2020, which are in line with the results of the NEP,

there is a notable shift in the political preferences of both subgroups, especially Hispanics without college degrees: In 2020, 62% of these voters supported Biden and 35% supported Trump, representing a variation of 20 percentage points compared to the figures for 2024. College-educated Hispanics, on the other hand, voted for Biden by a margin of 52% to Trump's 46% (UnidosUS, 2024), suggesting that support for the Republican candidate increased by more than 10 percentage points among this subgroup.

### 6.3.6. The Hispanic Vote in Florida and Economic Status

According to the NEP survey, 64% of Hispanics in Florida believe that their family's financial situation has worsened over the past four years. Of these, 85% voted for Trump and 15% for Harris (CNN, 2024). Once again, the data indicate that a majority of Hispanic voters in Florida who are dissatisfied with their economic situations believed that Trump's policies would improve their family finances. Most respondents (80%) said they consider the condition of the country's economy to be "fair or poor." Of these, 70% voted for Trump. This accounts for 56% of the state's total Hispanic electorate (CNN, 2024).

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According to the results of the 2024-AEVP, the three priority issues for Hispanics in Florida were cost of living and inflation (54%), jobs and the economy (39%), and cost of housing (29%). Data from the NYT/SC (2024a)<sup>26</sup> also indicate that the economy was by far the most important issue for Hispanic voters in the state (29%), followed by immigration and abortion (both 8%).

## 7. The Hispanic Vote in Swing States

### 7.1. Arizona

Arizona is a traditionally Republican state. Since 1952, it has seen only two presidential elections swing to the Democrats: in 1996 and 2020. However, in 2016

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<sup>26</sup> The Florida-focused NYT/SC poll (2024a) was conducted between September 29, 2024 and October 6, 2024, using a sample of 117 Hispanic voters.


Trump won the state with a smaller margin of victory than in previous years (48.7% vs. 45.1%), and in 2020 he lost to Joe Biden in a very tight election (49.4% vs. 49.1%) (270toWin, n.d.-a).

In 2024, the Republican Party took the state back—this time with a larger margin of victory. That year, Trump won with 52.2% of the state’s vote, while Harris received 46.7%. Victory in Arizona secured 11 electoral votes for the Republican Party (National Archives and Records Administration, 2025).

The Hispanic vote in Arizona can often prove decisive: the Pew Research Center estimates that around 1.35 million Hispanics were eligible to vote in the state in 2024, accounting for a quarter of Arizona’s total electorate (Krogstad et al., 2024).

The voting preferences of Hispanics in Arizona are in line with the trend of the state’s general electorate, which reports a decrease in support for the Democratic Party from 2020 to 2024, although all polls indicate an overall advantage for Harris over Trump among Hispanic voters, as Figure 34 illustrates:

FIGURE 34  
Hispanic Support for Candidates in Arizona, According to the NEP and 2024-AEVP



Source: Authors’ own work based on data from the NEP (CNN, 2024) and 2024-AEVP (UnidosUS, 2024).

According to the findings of the NEP,<sup>27</sup> represented in the sector diagram on the left, Harris received 54% of the Hispanic vote in Arizona, surpassing Trump, who received 44% (CNN, 2024). Although the Democratic candidate managed to maintain majority support among Hispanics, this support fell by 7 percentage points compared to 2020, when Biden received 61% of the Hispanic vote (CNN, 2020). At the same time, support for Trump increased by 7 points compared to the previous election.

The 2024-AEVP data, represented in the sector diagram on the right, give Harris a significantly higher margin of victory in Arizona. According to this poll, the vice president received 63% of the Hispanic vote compared to Donald Trump's 36% (UnidosUS, 2024). Similarly, the AEVP reports a 10-percentage-point increase in support for the Republican Party compared to the 2020 elections. According to this source, in 2020, 71% of Hispanic votes went to Biden and 26% to Trump (UnidosUS, 2024). The results of the NYT/SC survey<sup>28</sup> (2024e) are in line with the findings of the 2024-AEVP: 59% for Harris and 35% for Trump. The Arizona results are consistent with the national trend: The majority of Hispanic voters still prefer the Democratic Party, but support has declined compared to the 2020 results.

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## 7.2. Nevada

Nevada has long been a hotly contested state in presidential elections, and it was once again a key swing state in 2024. That year, Nevada delivered 6 electoral votes to Donald Trump, who won the state with 50.6% of the vote, while Kamala Harris received 47.5% (BBC News, 2024; National Archives and Records Administration, 2025). In the previous presidential election, on the other hand, the state went to Joe Biden, who beat Trump by a margin of 2.6 percentage points (50.6% vs. 47.5%) (270toWin, n.d.-d).

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<sup>27</sup> In the case of Arizona, the 2024 NEP data are based on a sample of 259 Hispanic voters (CNN, 2024). The 2020 NEP data for this same state are based on a sample of 1,639 voters, with Hispanics representing 19% of that sample group (CNN, 2020).


<sup>28</sup> The Arizona-focused NYT/SC poll (2024e) was conducted between October 25, 2024 and November 2, 2024, and relied on a sample of 233 Hispanic voters.

According to estimates by the Pew Research Center, around 485,000 Hispanics in Nevada were eligible to vote in 2024. These voters represent 22% of the state’s total electorate, a fraction that can prove decisive in the outcome of the election at the state level (Krogstad et al., 2024). In 2024, Nevada tipped in favor of the Republicans by a margin of only 46,000 votes (Politico, 2024c).

According to the NEP data<sup>29</sup> (see diagram on the left of Figure 35), in the last presidential election, Trump received 49% of the Hispanic vote, narrowly beating Harris, who received 47% (CNN, 2024). A comparison of the 2024 and 2020 NEP data also shows a significant increase in the Republican vote in Nevada, and a corresponding decrease in support for the Democrats. According to this poll, Biden won broad support from Hispanics in the state in 2020, receiving 61% of their vote, compared to 35% for Trump (CNN, 2020). Figure 35 once again shows a marked difference between the findings reported by the NEP and AEVP for 2024.

FIGURE 35

Hispanic Support for Candidates in Nevada, According to the NEP and 2024-AEVP



Source: Authors’ own work based on data from the NEP (CNN, 2024) and 2024-AEVP (UnidosUS, 2024).

<sup>29</sup> In the case of Nevada, the 2024 NEP data is based on a sample of 662 Hispanic voters (CNN, 2024). The 2020 NEP data for this same state is based on a sample of 721 Hispanic voters (CNN, 2020).

The NEP data contrast sharply with the findings of the 2024–AEVP (see diagram on the right) as well as the numbers reported by a state poll conducted by the NYT/SC,<sup>30</sup> both of which registered majority support for the Democratic candidate at an even higher rate than the national average. The 2024–AEVP indicates that 64% of Hispanics in Nevada backed Harris, while 35% supported Trump (UnidosUS, 2024).

The NYT/SC poll (2024f) reports nearly identical figures: 65% for Harris and 33% for Trump. Nevertheless, when we compare the findings of the 2024–AEVP with the analogous data for 2020, there is—as also indicated by the NEP—a clear redistribution of the Hispanic vote in favor of the Republican Party, and to the detriment of the Democrats. In 2020, 70% of Hispanics in Nevada voted for Biden while only 25% voted for Trump (UnidosUS, 2024). According to the data from this poll, the Republican candidate improved his results by 10 percentage points.

### 7.3. Pennsylvania

After losing the state to Joe Biden in 2020, Trump won it back again in 2024, just as he had in 2016. In the last presidential election, the Republican candidate won the state with a 50.4% majority, compared to Harris’s 48.7% (BBC News, 2024). Pennsylvania thus contributed 19 electoral votes to Trump, secured by a margin of just over 121,000 votes (Politico, 2024f; National Archives and Records Administration, 2025).

According to estimates by the Pew Research Center, approximately 615,000 Hispanics were eligible to vote in the 2024 presidential election in Pennsylvania, representing 6% of the state’s electorate (Krogstad et al., 2024). Once again, in the context of such a tight race, mobilizing the Hispanic electorate became especially relevant.


In 2024, Hispanic voters in Pennsylvania exhibited a strong preference for the

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<sup>30</sup> The Nevada-focused NYT/SC poll (2024f) was conducted between October 24, 2024 and November 2, 2024, and relied on a sample of 225 Hispanic voters.

Democratic Party, though the findings of the NEP<sup>31</sup> indicate significantly higher levels of support for Trump than those reported by the 2024-AEVP, as Figure 36 shows. According to the NEP figures, Harris received 59% of the Hispanic vote, surpassing Trump’s 41%. This places Harris’s performance 8 points above the 51% national average reported by the NEP (CNN, 2024). The 2024-AEVP, meanwhile, registered majority support for Harris to the tune of 70%, compared to Trump’s 28% (UnidosUS, 2024)—an 11-point difference with respect to the data published by the NEP.

FIGURE 36  
Hispanic Support for Candidates in Pennsylvania, According to the NEP and 2024-AEVP



Source: Authors’ own work based on data from the NEP (CNN, 2024) and 2024-AEVP (UnidosUS, 2024).

These two polls yielded nearly identical data on Hispanic voting preferences in the 2020 presidential election—both report 69% support for Biden, while the NEP indicates 27% for Trump and the 2024-AEVP reports 26% (CNN, 2024; UnidosUS, 2024). However, when we compare these results with the findings for 2024, the NEP suggests a significant, 10-percentage-point drop in support for the Democrats and a 14-point

<sup>31</sup> In the case of Pennsylvania, the 2024 NEP figures are based on a sample of 3,000 voters, with 6% Hispanic representation (CNN, 2024). The 2020 NEP data for this same state are based on a sample of 3,090 voters, with 5% Hispanic representation (CNN, 2020).

increase for the Republicans. In contrast, the 2024–AEVP data do not suggest any notable change in the electoral behavior of Hispanics in Pennsylvania from 2020 to 2024.

#### 7.4. Georgia

Georgia was also a key swing state in the 2024 presidential election and, like the other six, it tipped in favor of the Republican candidate. Donald Trump won Georgia with 50.7% of the vote, while Harris received 48.5% (BBC News, 2024). This win delivered 16 electoral votes to the Republican Party (National Archives and Records Administration, 2025).

Georgia’s Hispanic population exceeds one million people. Roughly 485,000 Hispanics—6% of the state’s total electorate—were eligible to vote in the last presidential election (Krogstad et al., 2024). Although Hispanics in Georgia do not represent as large a share of the electorate as they do in the states discussed above, election results are often very close, so Hispanic participation can prove decisive. While Trump’s margin of victory in Georgia in 2024 was less than Biden’s in 2020, the state went to the Republicans by a difference of only 115,000 votes (Politico, 2024f). Thus, even assuming that only half of the Hispanic electorate turns out to vote, this demographic can still decide the result of the election at the state level.

Hispanic voters in Georgia continue to show a clear preference for Democratic candidates. According to the results of the NEP,<sup>32</sup> presented in the diagram on the left of Figure 37, Harris received 59% of the Hispanic vote in 2024, far surpassing Trump’s 41% (CNN, 2024).


The 2024–AEVP suggests an even more favorable distribution for the Democrats: 64% in favor of Harris, 35% in favor of Trump (UnidosUS, 2024). If we consider only the

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<sup>32</sup> In the case of Georgia, the 2024 NEP data are based on a sample of 4,398 voters, with 8% Hispanic representation (CNN, 2024). The 2020 NEP data for this same state are based on a sample of 4,385 voters, with 7% Hispanic representation (CNN, 2020).

Hispanic vote, both sources suggest that Georgia is a Democratic stronghold where support for Harris exceeds the national average (CNN, 2024).

FIGURE 37  
Hispanic Support for Candidates in Georgia, According to the NEP and 2024-AEVP



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Source: Authors' own work based on data from the NEP (CNN, 2024) and 2024-AEVP (UnidosUS, 2024).

However, in line with the national trend, support for Democrats decreased when compared to 2020. According to the NEP, Biden won 62% of the vote in 2020, while Trump received 37% (CNN, 2020). A comparison of the AEVP data suggests a greater variation in the distribution of votes: In 2020, the poll registered 69% Hispanic support for Biden and 28% for Trump (UnidosUS, 2024). Notably, the results of the two surveys also differed significantly in 2020, when the percentage of Republican support reported by the NEP exceeded the AEVP estimates by 9 percentage points.

### 7.5. North Carolina


North Carolina is the only one of the seven 2024 swing states that the Democratic candidate did not win in 2020. Trump secured the state in 2024 with 51% of the vote,

surpassing the Democratic candidate's 47.8%—a slightly better result than the previous presidential election (BBC News, 2024; 270toWin, n.d.-e).

Like many southern states, North Carolina was a Democratic stronghold from 1876 to 1964, but has been predominantly Republican since 1968 (270toWin, n.d.-e). In 2024, North Carolina delivered 16 electoral votes to Trump (National Archives and Records Administration, 2025). Although the number of Hispanics in the state exceeds one million, only 40% were eligible to vote in 2024. In total, there are approximately 445,000 Hispanic voters in North Carolina, representing 6% of the state electorate (Krogstad et al., 2024). Considering that the North Carolina election result was decided by just over 183,000 votes, Hispanic turnout may have played a key role in the outcome (Politico, 2024f).

Figure 38 illustrates a significant difference between the results of the two exit polls for North Carolina:

FIGURE 38  
Hispanic Support for Candidates in North Carolina, According to the NEP and 2024-AEVP



Source: Authors' own work based on data from the NEP (CNN, 2024) and 2024-AEVP (UnidosUS, 2024).

According to the findings of the NEP, the Hispanic vote was narrowly divided in North Carolina, showing a slight advantage for Trump (50%) over Harris (49%) (CNN, 2024).

The 2024–AEVP survey, however, reports a clear Democratic majority, with 63% of Hispanics in favor of Harris and 35% in favor of Trump (UnidosUS, 2024).

In 2020, the NEP did not collect data on the Hispanic vote in the state, but the percentages reported by the AEVP for that year (72% for Biden and 24% for Trump) show a clear increase in Republican support, with an approximately 10-percentage-point redistribution in favor of Trump (UnidosUS, 2024).

## 7.6. Michigan

In 2024, Donald Trump secured Michigan’s 15 electoral votes by winning the state with 49.7% of the vote, while Harris received 48.3% (BBC News, 2024; National Archives and Records Administration, 2025).


74 Although Michigan’s Hispanic population is considerably smaller than that of other states discussed in this report, the Hispanic vote may nevertheless have proved decisive in the results of the state’s presidential election: The outcome in Michigan was decided by a margin of 80,000 votes (Politico, 2024f), in a state that is home to some 310,000 Hispanic voters who represent 4% of the state’s total electorate (Krogstad et al., 2024).

According to the NEP,<sup>33</sup> Hispanics in Michigan favored the Republican Party, with 58% voting for Trump and 37% for Harris (CNN, 2024). As Figure 39 shows, the results of the NEP once again differed significantly from the findings of the 2024–AEVP, which reports a majority preference of 64% for the vice president, compared to 33% for the Republican candidate (UnidosUS, 2024).

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<sup>33</sup> In the case of Michigan, the 2024 NEP data are based on a sample of 2,855 voters, with 6% Hispanic representation (CNN, 2024).

FIGURE 39  
Hispanic Support for Candidates in Michigan, According to the NEP and 2024-AEVP




Source: Authors' own work based on data from the NEP (CNN, 2024) and 2024-AEVP (UnidosUS, 2024).

With respect to changes in the Hispanic vote in Michigan from 2020 to 2024, the only figures we are able to cite are from the 2020 AEVP poll. That year, 76% of Hispanics in the state voted for Biden and 22% voted for Trump (UnidosUS). This suggests that in Michigan, there was also a considerable redistribution of the Hispanic vote in favor of the Republican candidate.

### 7.7. Wisconsin

Of the seven swing states in the 2024 elections, Wisconsin has the smallest Hispanic population. Out of the approximately 445,000 Hispanics in Wisconsin, roughly 215,000 were eligible to vote in the last presidential election—5% of the state's total electorate (Krogstad et al., 2024). The majority of these voters opted for the Democratic candidate, as shown by the polling data represented in Figure 40:

FIGURE 40  
Hispanic Support for Candidates in Wisconsin, According to the NEP and 2024-AEVP



Source: Authors' own work based on data from the NEP (CNN, 2024) and 2024-AEVP (UnidosUS, 2024).

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According to the NEP data,<sup>34</sup> 60% of respondents voted for Harris and 38% voted for Trump (CNN, 2024). This poll indicates that support for the Democratic Party in Wisconsin exceeded the national average by almost 10 percentage points.

The 2024-AEVP also reports a majority preference for Democrats among Hispanics in the state: 64% in favor of Harris and 34% in favor of Trump (UnidosUS). These figures do not differ significantly from the data provided by the poll on the average Hispanic vote at the national level. Although Wisconsin's Hispanic population voted mostly Democratic, the state went to Donald Trump, who won with 49.7% of the vote, while Harris received 48.8%. This narrow advantage gave Trump the 10 electoral votes allotted to the state in 2024 (BBC News, 2024; National Archives and Records Administration, 2025).

<sup>34</sup> In the case of Wisconsin, the 2024 NEP data are based on a sample of 2,956 voters, with 6% Hispanic representation (CNN, 2024).

## 8. General Conclusions

This report on the Hispanic vote in the 2024 U.S. presidential election builds on a growing body of publications highlighting the increasing importance of the Hispanic electorate in shaping the country's political landscape. While the Hispanic community remains underrepresented in U.S. elections, participation is on the rise. The demographic growth of the Hispanic electorate, coupled with higher voter turnout, resulted in a record share of Hispanic votes cast in the 2024 presidential election.

This study confirms that the Hispanic vote is not homogeneous but varies according to a number of demographic and geographic factors. Nevertheless, the data compiled in this report clearly indicate that the Hispanic vote in the U.S. remains overwhelmingly Democratic. Nevertheless, all the polls examined above suggest a significant redistribution of the Hispanic vote in favor of the Republican Party, although the scale of this shift in voting preference differs considerably from one source to another.

In general, the party preferences of Hispanic voters vary considerably according to key demographic variables. With respect to age, voters over the age of 50 registered the highest level of support for the Republican Party, while voters between the ages of 18 and 29 reported the most significant change in voting preferences.

In addition, we observed notable differences with respect to sex. Hispanic men voted for the Republican candidate more than Hispanic women, whose support for the Democratic Party remains strong. When we consider the variables of sex and age together, the shift toward the Republican Party among Hispanic voters is especially notable among young men, while this redistribution is significantly less pronounced among women of the same age group.

Moreover, the distribution of the Hispanic vote varies according to language spoken at home: Hispanic voters from bilingual households or whose primary language is Spanish tend to vote more strongly in favor of Democrats, while voters whose primary home language is English report comparatively higher levels of support for the Republicans. These results are consistent with the shift toward the Republican Party observed among young Hispanics—a trend that also applies to the youth vote in the

U.S. in general. Most third-generation Hispanic youth, or youth of subsequent generations, are monolingual English speakers. This has a direct influence on the sources that they rely on for political information, which are generally the same as those used by their non-Hispanic peers.

When it comes to the main issues of concern for Hispanics in the 2024 presidential election, the polls leave no doubt that the top priority is family economics, both nationally and in every state surveyed. Moreover, a significant percentage of Hispanics who are dissatisfied with their economic situations also believed that Trump's policies would have a positive impact on their personal finances and well-being.

Furthermore, national identity and country of origin also influence political preferences. Cuban Americans, who are traditionally aligned with the Republican Party, maintained this alignment in 2024. In fact, all polls analyzed for this study report majority support for the Republican Party among Hispanics of Cuban origin or descent. The majority of Mexicans and Puerto Ricans, on the other hand, continue to support the Democratic Party. Similarly, all polls indicate a shift toward the Republican Party among Hispanics of all national origins, although figures vary widely between polls.

This discrepancy between sources—especially between the two most widely referenced exit polls, the NEP and 2024-AEVP—is undoubtedly the most significant finding of this study. The disparity between the percentages reported by these different sources underscores the importance of exercising extreme caution when drawing conclusions about the impact of the Hispanic vote on election results, and when formulating estimates based exclusively on data from the NEP, which reports unprecedented support for the Republican Party among Hispanic voters.

Furthermore, according to calculations based on the most commonly cited estimates, the Hispanic vote was not decisive for Donald Trump's victory in the 2024 presidential election in any of the seven swing states, nor in the three states with the largest Hispanic populations and the most votes in the Electoral College system. Even in states where Hispanic support for the Republican candidate was especially high, such as Florida, a total absence of Hispanic votes would not have changed the election outcome.

These findings are at odds with the prevailing public opinion narrative. In the 2024 U.S. presidential election, the Hispanic community was the focus of unprecedented media attention, both during the campaign and in the post-election analysis. Given that the Hispanic electorate's party preferences are associated with highly controversial issues such as unauthorized immigration, deportation policies, language use, and crime, we should exercise caution when analyzing this community's voting behavior. It is essential that we avoid perpetuating generalizations that lack solid empirical foundations, which can nevertheless have a major influence on the public discourse.

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57. Daniel Moreno-Moreno. *The hybrid made flesh. The Legacy of a Hispanic-American Thinker: Jorge/George Santayana / The Hybrid Made Flesh. The Legacy of a Hispanic-American Thinker: Jorge/George Santayana.* (In Spanish: 057-01/2020SP; in English: 057-01/2020EN) January/January 2020.
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59. Mónica Álvarez Estévez. *Between two shores: Galician immigration in New York. Morriña e identidades transnacionales / Between Two Shores: Galician Immigration to New York. Morriña and transnational identities.* (In Spanish: 059-03/2020SP; in English: 059-03/2020EN) March/March 2020.
60. Marta Mateo, María Bovea, Natalie Ramírez (eds.). *Reshaping Hispanic Cultures: 2019 Instituto Cervantes Symposium on Recent Scholarship. Vol. I. Identity, Language & Teaching.* (060-04/2020SP) April 2020.
61. Marta Mateo, María Bovea, Natalie Ramírez (eds.). *Reshaping Hispanic Cultures: 2019 Instituto Cervantes Symposium on Recent Scholarship. Vol. II. Art and Literature.* (061-05/2020SP) Mayo 2020.
62. Godoy Peñas, Juan A. *Are you Black or Latino? Ser afro-latino en los Estados Unidos / Are You Black or Latino? Being Latino in the United States.* (En español: 062-06/2020SP; in English: 062-06/2020EN) Junio/June 2020.
63. Eduardo Viñuela. *Pop in Spanish in the U.S.: A Space to Articulate the Latino Identity.* (In Spanish: 063-09/2020SP; in English: 063-09/2020EN) September/September 2020.
64. Marjorie Agosín, Emma Romeu, Clara Eugenia Ronderos. *Living in English, Writing in Spanish: The Poetry of Absence.* (In Spanish: 064-10/2020SP; in English: 064-10/2020EN) October/October 2020.
65. Cristina Lacomba. *Hispanos y/o latinos en Estados Unidos: La construcción social de una identidad / Hispanics and/or Latinos in the United States: The Social Construction of an Identity.* (In Spanish: 065-11/2020SP; in English: 065-11/2020EN) November/November 2020.

66. Lucía Guerra. *Literary translations. Diffusion and translation processes of the work of María Luisa Bombal in the United States / Literary Shifts. María Luisa Bombal: Circulation and Translation Processes in the United States.* (In Spanish: 066-12/2020SP; in English: 066-12/2020EN) December/December 2020.
67. Leyla Rouhi. *Literary translations. On La Celestina and its English translations / Literary Shifts. On La Celestina and English Translations.* (In Spanish: 067-01/2021SP; in English: 067-01/2021EN) January/January 2021.
68. Miriam Perandones Lozano. *La recepción del Hispanismo musical en Nueva York en el cambio de siglo XIX-XX y el boom del teatro lírico español a través de Enrique Granados y Quinito Valverde / Reception of Musical Hispanism in New York at the Turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century and the Boom in Spanish Lyric Theatre through the Work of Enrique Granados and Quinito Valverde.* (In Spanish: 068-02/2021SP; in English: 068-02/2021EN) February/February 2021.
69. Raquel Chang-Rodríguez. *Luis Jerónimo de Oré and his Relación (c. 1619): el testimonio de un peruano en La Florida española / Luis Jerónimo de Oré and his Relación (c. 1619): A Peruvian's Account of Spanish Florida.* (In Spanish: 069-03/2021SP; in English: 069-03/2021EN) March/March 2021.
70. Zuzanna Fuchs. *Spanish as a Heritage Language in the US : How Heritage Languages Can Contribute to Disentangling Factors Driving Language Development.* (in Spanish: 070-04/2021; in English: 070-04/2021EN) April/April 2021.
71. María Luisa Parra Velasco. *The Spanish Workshops: A Collaborative Training Project for Teachers of Spanish as a Heritage Language in Secondary and Higher Education.* (In Spanish: 071-05/2021SP; in English: 071-05/2021EN) May/May 2021.
72. Marta Mateo, Juan Manuel Arias, María Bovea-Pascual (eds.). *New Perspectives on Hispanic Cultures: Hispanism and Spanish in the U.S. over the Last 30 Years. Observatorio Instituto Cervantes Symposium 2021.* (072-09/2021SP) Septiembre/September 2021.
73. Diego Pascual y Cabo, Gabriela Rivera-Marín. *Understanding and Addressing Linguistic Aggressions in the Spanish Heritage Language Classroom* (En español: 073-11/2021SP; in English: 073-11/2021EN) Noviembre/November 2021.
74. Javier A. Cancio-Donlebún Ballvé. *The King of Spain's Slaves in St. Augustine, Florida (1580–1618)* (En español: 074-12/2021SP; in English: 074-12/2021EN) December/December 2021.
75. Francisca González Arias. *Literary translations. The English Translations of Works by Emilia Pardo Bazán in the United States of the Fin-de-Siècle* (En español: 075-01/2022SP; en English: 075-01/2022EN) January/January 2022.
76. Marta Pérez-Carbonell. *Literary translations. The English translations of the work of Javier Marías and its presence in the United States / Literary Shifts. English Language Translations of the Works of Javier Marías and Their Presence in the United States* (En español: 076-03/2022SP; in English: 076-03/2022sEN) March/March 2022.

77. Ángel López García-Molins. *Reflexiones multidisciplinares sobre el espanglish / Multidisciplinary Reflections on Spanglish* (En español: 077-04/2022SP; en English: 077-04/2022EN) Abril/April 2021.
78. Enrique Martínez García, María Teresa Martínez García. *The Economic Value of Spanish in the United States: Opportunities and Challenges for the Future* (En español: 078-05/2022SP; in English: 078-05/2022EN) May/May 2022.
79. Félix Fernández de Castro. *Textos fonéticos del español habla en Estados Unidos (1912 - 2006) / Phonetic Texts of Spanish Spoken in the United States (1912-2006)*. (In Spanish: 079-06/2022SP; in English: 079-06/2022EN) June/June 2022.
80. Danny Erker, Lee-Ann Marie Vidal-Covas. *What We Say When We Say Nothing at All: Clues to Contact-Induced Language Change in Spanish Conversational Pause-Fillers*. (In Spanish: 080-09/2022EN; in English: 080-09/2022EN) September/September 2022.
81. José Antonio Mazzotti. *Tribute to Trilce from the United States on the Centenary of its Publication: A Revolution that Lasts*. (In Spanish: 081-11/2022SP; in English: 081-11/2022EN) November/November 2022.
82. Macarena García-Avello. *The Latinx Generation: Longings of Voices from the Border*. (In Spanish: 082-12/2022SP; in English: 082-12/2022EN) December/December 2022.
83. Nick Basbanes. *The Grooming of a Harvard Hispanist: George Ticknor's Mentorship of Henry Wadsworth Longfellow*. (In Spanish: 083-01/2023SP; in English: 083-01/2023EN) January/January 2023.
84. Cristina Lacomba. *Mapa hispano de los Estados Unidos 2022 / Hispanic Map of the United States 2022*. (In Spanish: 084-02/2023SP; in English: 084-02/2023EN) February/February 2023.
85. Carmen García de la Rasilla (Coord.). *Salvador Dalí in the United States*. (In Spanish: 085-04/2023SP; in English: 085-04/2023EN) April/April 2023.
86. Isabel Pérez Dobarro, Molly Nelson-Haber, Patricia Kleinman. *The García Family: A Musical Journey between Spain and the U.S.* (In Spanish: 086-06/2023SP; in English: 086-06/2023EN) June/June 2023.
87. Marta Mateo, Christian de León, Joseph Rager (eds.). *New Perspectives on Hispanic Cultures: Dissemination and Didactics of Spanish in Science and Medicine*. (087-10/2023) October/October 2023.
88. Carlos Ramos. *Exiles, Creators, and Trailblazing Women: Hispanists at Wellesley College*. (In Spanish: 088-11/2023SP; in English: 088-11/2023EN) November/November 2023.
89. Eva Valero Juan. *The poetic work of José Antonio Mazzotti in the USA: Declinaciones latinas and Las flores del Mall*. (In Spanish: 089-01/2024EN; in English: 089-01/2024EN) January/January 2024.
90. Beatriz Carolina Peña. *Corso, slavery and resistance: Afro-Spaniards from the Greater Caribbean in Colonial North America*. (In Spanish: 090-02/2024SP; in English: 090-02/2024EN) February/February 2024.

91. Garbiñe Iztueta-Goizueta, Monika Madinabeitia-Medrano. *Panorama de los Estudios Vascos en Estados Unidos / An Overview of Basque Studies in the United States*. (In Spanish: 091-06/2024SP; in English: 091-06/2024EN) June/June 2024.
92. Richard Kagan. *Francis Sales, George Ticknor, and the Beginnings of Spanish Language Instruction in the United States*. (In Spanish: 092-07/2024SP; in English: 092-07/2024EN) July/July 2024.
93. Erik Garabaya Casado and Joseph Rager (eds.). *New Perspectives on Hispanic Cultures: La traducción entre el español y el inglés en los Estados Unidos / English-Spanish Translation in the US Context*. (093-10/2024) October/October 2024.
94. Jorge Braga Riera. *Lope de Vega Crosses the Pond: The Fate of Fuente Ovejuna in the United States*. (In Spanish: 094-03/2025EN; in English: 094-03/2025EN) March/March 2025.

